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1. Introduction 
 
This article offers an internalist explanatory model for the evolutionary origins of 
the computational system of the human faculty of language (FL), inspired by 
ideas worked out during the last decades in the field of Evolutionary 
Developmental Biology (Evo–Devo). In particular, we adopt the framework of 
‘morphological evolution’ elaborated by Pere Alberch (1954–1998) in a series of 
papers published in the eighties and nineties of the last century (namely, Alberch 
1980, 1989, 1991). 
 Evo–Devo aims to explain the origins and evolution of natural designs 
(phylogeny) by means of hereditary perturbations affecting the developmental 
plans of organisms (ontogeny); see in particular Hall (1999, 2002), Hall & Olson 
(2003a), Robert (2004), Carroll (2005), García–Azkonobieta (2005), and Laubichler 
& Maienschein (2007). Against this background, the essence of Alberch’s 
proposal can be summarized by the following statements. A plan for the devel-
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opment of an organism consists of a set of morphogenetic parameters (not just 
genetic factors). Interactions among these parameters are complex and they relate 
non-linearly with phenotypic outcomes. This means that a parameter can be 
continuously changing without any significant consequence. However, once a 
certain critical value is reached, a minor change of the same parameter can be 
enough to introduce some radical phenotypic manifestation. These minor but far 
reaching perturbations on development can eventually attain evolutionary 
significance. Thus, evolutionary novelties can emerge without introducing new 
developmental factors or changing the nature of interactions. Finally, a system of 
morphogenetic parameters sets the limits of the forms attainable from such a 
developmental plan. As a consequence, the direction that development can take 
from a certain phenotypic state is strongly constrained by the geometry of the 
parametric space so defined. 
 The idea that evolution is strongly constrained by the very same factors 
that strongly constrain the development of individuals is common ground for 
every Evo–Devo oriented approach. Conversely, this idea is not congenial with 
the more classical stances of neo-Darwinian selectionism. According to the 
adherents of Modern Evolutionary Synthesis (MES), natural selection acts on the 
diversity randomly introduced into populations by point genetic mutations, 
totally unrestricted in scope (see the classical formulations of Morgan et al. 1915, 
Dobzhansky 1937, Mayr 1942, Huxley 1942, and Simpson 1944; see also Mayr & 
Provine 1980 for a general overview). Consequently, natural selection is believed 
to be the only creative force capable of organizing an otherwise amorphous 
material. Evo–Devoists, in contrast, attribute part of this creative capacity to 
constraints acting upon development and that limit the scope of attainable 
designs: They redefine natural selection as a mechanism filtering out those 
designs which fit environmental and populational conditions more efficiently 
(see Goodwin 1994: 143 or Wagensberg 2004: 125, as well as Alberch 1980: 664, 
Oster & Alberch 1982: 455, Alberch 1989: 46–48, and Alberch 1991: 16). 
 In this article we contend that the Evo–Devo theses thus far advanced can 
be readily extended to the evolutionary study of the nervous system and 
cognition (see Griffiths & Stotz 2000, Amundson 2006, Finlay 2007, and Griffiths 
2007, for some programmatic attempts in this direction). Our interest will be 
focused on the case of language, seen as a particular aspect of human cognition 
and, more specifically, on the computational system in charge of generating 
internal linguistic expressions (Chomsky 1986). This system is thought to contain 
some unique features in the context of animal cognition, hence its special interest 
(Hauser et al. 2002). 
 The main claim of the present contribution is that the different levels of 
computational complexity reflected in the Chomsky Hierarchy (Chomsky 1956a, 
1959) are the possible phenotypes of a cognitive parametric space defined by a 
restricted set of morphogenetic factors. These parameters are non-linearly related 
to the development of the cortical resources that supply the memory 
requirements of each computational model. We argue that the kind of (mildly) 
context-sensitive grammar which can be attributed to the computational system 
of FL is an emergent consequence of a minor perturbation affecting the 
development of a cortico-striatal circuit, once the value of a morphogenetic 
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parameter attains a certain critical value in the course of human evolution. Thus, 
the adoption of this computational regime by FL can be seen as an evolutionary 
outcome strictly channeled by the organic conditions settled by the parameters at 
hand. We present this idea as an alternative view to that held by contemporary 
evolutionary psychology, whose practitioners defend the view that the mind is a 
collection of purpose-specific modules, each one an adaptively meticulous 
answer to environmental (or external) conditions (see Pinker 1997, Plotkin 1997, 
or Buss 2007, as well as the application of Pinker & Bloom 1990 and Jackendoff 
2002 to the evolution of FL). The internalist proposal put forward in this article is 
based on the idea that the internal organization of the mind is in itself a constrai-
ning system that biases evolution in favor of certain forms of cognition and limits 
the power of the environment in the shaping of the organic design of minds.1 
 This is not to say that environmental and populational factors can be 
completely put aside by internalist-oriented theories. Actually, no evolutionary 
theory that ignores the external factors acting as selective criteria for the diversity 
independently brought into being will be complete. In this sense, we advance a 
proposal according to which the originally maladaptive character of this feature 
of the human cognitive phenotype would, in an apparently paradoxical way, 
have played a crucial role in its fixation as a species feature. 
 The article is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to presenting the 
basic tenets of Evo–Devo as well as Alberch’s model of morphological evolution. 
Section 3 introduces an extension of this model to cognition and applies it to the 
evolutionary origins of the computational system of FL. We conclude with some 
reflections concerning the application of our ideas to explaining the origins of FL 
in a broader sense. 
 
 
2. Evolving through Development 
 
A somehow unexpected episode in the history of biology was the recent divorce 
between the study of individual development (the classical subject matter of 
Embryology) and that of evolution at the species level (in charge of Population 
Genetics for the most part of the twentieth century). This fact was directly related 
to the fixing by the MES of the concept of evolution as a series of changes in the 
patterns of allelic distribution among the members of the same population (see 
Amundson 2007: Part I and West–Eberhard 2003: chap. 1). The idea has been 
used to justify the exclusion of the path leading from the variants of genes to the 
adult features from evolutionary explanations. The underlying argument can be 
summed up as follows. If the only thing that matters in natural selection is 
having of those versions of features capable of increasing the reproductive rates 
of organisms, then evolution can safely be thought of as a continuous 
redistributive process of the alleles that correlate with those features within the 
gene pool of a population. As a consequence, (i) natural selection (i.e. the external 
factors challenging the organism’s endurance and, above all, its reproductive 
                                                
    1 On the contrast between externalist and internalist approaches, as well as on the history of 
the debate, see Alberch (1991: 25–28).  
Computational Phenotypes 
 
5 
success) can be conceptualized as a mechanism acting upon point mutations 
randomly introduced on certain genomic positions, and (ii) natural selection can 
be credited as a creative force working on an unrestricted source of diversity. 
According to Amundson’s analysis, this argument is the agency ultimately 
responsible for having converted the processes that transform genes into features 
(or, more generally, the genotype into a phenotype) within MES-oriented 
biological thinking into a ‘black box’ (see Amundson 2007: 157 — especially his 
Figure 6 — and Reid 2007: chap. 1; see also Gould 1977 and Bonner 1982). 
 
2.1. Evolutionary Developmental Biology (Evo–Devo): Common Background 
and Alternative Views 
 
In our opinion, Amundson’s statement is not completely accurate, because MES’s 
vision of the evolutionary process does not only rely on ignoring the complexities 
of individual development and declaring it inert for any evolutionary concern. 
Underlying this vision there is also a model of organic development based on a 
very simple and linear conception of the phenotypic expression of genes, schema-
tically represented in Figure 1 [A]. Such a conception is a necessary condition for 
upholding a view on organic evolution such as that represented in Figure 1 [B]: 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
           C 
 
A           B 
Figure 1:  Modern Evolutionary Synthesis. 
[A. Development. — The role of genes is central in the evolutionary process; they 
correlate with the phenotype in a simple and linear fashion. B. Evolution. — Natural 
selection acts creatively, imposing order on random point mutations, a noisy and 
unrestricted source of diversity. C. As a consequence, development (A) lacks any causal 
role in the evolutionary process (B).] 
 
 There are many factors that lead us to the conclusion that the omission of 
development from evolutionary matters cannot be sustained as straightforwardly 
as the argument seems to indicate. Some of these reasons are even coherent with 
other basic tenets of MES. For example, it should be clear to everyone that the 
simple fact of being capable of reaching the adult state is as important as being an 
adult optimally fitted to overcoming all kinds of environmental aggression. This 
Organism 
Development 
PHENOTYPE 
SELECTION 
(directionality) 
Genes MUTATION 
(noise) 
C 
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implies that alternative routes of organic development can also reasonably be 
deemed targets of natural selection. As Gilbert (2003: 3) aptly puts it: “Every 
animal has to function as it builds itself”. Consequently, a developmental path 
that makes the organism more robust from the start or allows an earlier 
emergence of certain key features, among other possibilities, is probably to be 
selected instead of other paths. The organism will obviously flourish and 
proliferate within the population. With a move like this, development can be 
added ‘without tears’ to the agenda of MES oriented approaches.2 One only 
needs to conceptualize a developmental path as a specific phenotypic manifes-
tation that, according to the Mendelian–Morganian idealization, correlates with 
certain genomic positions in a simple and linear fashion. Actually, this is the 
theoretical direction taken by a particular Evo–Devo trend, which relies on the 
assumption that evolution is mainly due to point mutations affecting genomic 
positions in charge of the regulation of the genetic activity during development. 
This view, accessibly introduced in Carroll (2005), can safely be judged a con-
structive enlargement of the strictly genocentric model of the MES. 
 However, this model is explicitly rejected by a number of Evo–Devo 
practitioners who share the belief that (i) genes are not the only causal agents in 
development, and that (ii) they are not the only developmental material capable 
of being transmitted from one generation to the next (see Figure 2 [A] below). 
These assumptions introduce a new and extended notion of heredity into 
evolutionary theory and they open an important conceptual breakdown with 
more orthodox forms of neo-Darwinism (see Jablonka & Lamb 2005 as a case in 
point). Underlying this theoretical move is the following line of reasoning: 
 
(A) Genes are part of complex developmental processes in which other non–
genetic factors are also causally involved (such as cellular products, mecha-
nisms of cellular communication, intermediate phenotypic states, environ-
mental factors, behavioral practices, and so on); 
(B) to the extent that (i) all these factors exhibit some degree of individual vari-
ation, (ii) the variation is persistent throughout generations, and (iii) it can 
have repercussions on the unequal reproductive rates attained by the indi-
viduals so differentiated, it is possible to conclude that they all have a role 
in evolution not different from that customarily credited to genes;3 
(C) hence, the Mendelian–Morganian idealization (establishing that the only 
evolutionary relevant correlation is that between genetic factors and pheno-
typic features) is untenable. 
                                                
    2  Waddington’s (1957) concept of ‘canalization’ can be seen as a pioneering formulation of 
this stance. Waddington contended that developmental paths become stabilized and 
strengthened by continuous exposure to the rigors of natural selection. As a consequence, 
certain biases or constrictions on development could be explained as a direct consequence of 
standard Darwinian selection (for some comments on this matter, see Maynard Smith et al. 
1985: 270). 
    3  In Hall & Olson’s (2003b: xiv) words: “Phenotypes and the processes that produce them are 
subject to selection; cells, embryos, and modifications of genetic and developmental 
processes are as much the raw material of evolution as are genes and mutations”. 
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 This is a non-trivial achievement of modern evolutionary thinking. 
However, it has not given place to a monolithic theoretical frame, but to a cluster 
of different and somehow confronted perspectives (Figure 2 [B]).4 The main theo-
retical parameters underlying the diversity of approaches in this research field 
have to do with the number and levels of factors involved in developmental 
processes, the role and relative significance of each one, the nature of the inter-
actions they sustain and the way they correlate with the phenotypic outcomes 
(see Robert et al. 2001 and especially Robert 2004). As a consequence, Evo–Devo 
houses theoretical stances as varied as those that maintain intact the “genetic 
program” metaphor (as Carroll 2005), those that extend the metaphor beyond the 
genetic factor and introduce the idea of a multidimensional “developmental pro-
gram” (see Keller 2000 and Moore 2001), or even those that abandon the quasi-
algorithmic image of development of the “program” meta-phor and endorse 
instead a concept of “developmental system” with complex interactions among 
factors of very different sorts that relate non-linearly with the successive pheno-
typic stages (see Griffiths & Gray 1994, Oyama 2000a, and Oyama et al. 2001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A                B 
Figure 2:  Evolutionary Developmental Biology (Evo–Devo) 
[A. Organic designs are the outcome of complex developmental processes involving 
different types of factors, all relevant from an evolutionary point of view. B. The diversity 
of the factors (multidimensionality) and the complexity of their interactions (complexity) 
are the main theoretical parameters underlying the plurality of Evo–Devo thinking.] 
 
 
 
 The following contentions, even if there is not complete consensus about 
them, are unquestionably at the core of Evo–Devo thinking: 
 
                                                
    4   As Hall & Olson (2003b: xv) put it: “No unified theory of Evo–Devo exists”. 
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(A) Neither natural designs nor the successive stages of an organism until 
attaining its adult steady state are preformed in genotypes; 
(B) every particular stage in development is the result of complex interactions 
among multiple factors,5 including the phenotypic state previously 
attained; 
(C) genes are not the only developmental agents with a causal role in the 
evolutionary process; and 
(D) the role of genes in development and evolution is not in a higher rank with 
respect to all the remaining factors. 
 
Within this framework, the rigidity of the MES image on the evolutionary 
process, based on the centrality of genes and the omnipotence of natural selection 
in the shaping of organisms, is being left behind by Evo–Devo practitioners. In its 
place, a much more worked out image of development is currently allowing an 
understanding of ways in which the evolutionary process can be biased in favor 
of certain formal solutions even at the cost of losses in terms of fitness. In this 
regard, the following contentions are also highly representative of present-day 
Evo–Devo thinking: 
 
(A) Certain developmental pathways are extremely conservative, in the sense 
that they are manifested, with minor modifications, across very distant 
taxa. The use of those very similar pathways in very different develop-
mental contexts, resulting in a high degree of phenotypic variation, is a 
significant feature of evolution;6 
(B) the above-mentioned modifications of the developmental pathways can be 
classified using a limited (and in itself constraining) inventory of descrip-
tive categories: Displacements of onset and offset points, modifications of 
the rates of growth, alterations of the terminal state, changes in the plan of 
execution, and so on (see, among other sources, Gould 1977: Part II, Parker 
2000, and Alba 2002); 
(C) both the persistence of developmental pathways and the restrictive 
character of their possible routes of change must be seen as forces counter-
acting the pressures of the environment. As such, they must be acknow-
ledged with a creative character similar (if not superior) to that of natural 
selection. 
 
                                                
    5  Johnston & Edwards (2002) is an especially significant model, based on fourteen different 
kinds of factors and almost thirty paths of interaction.  
    6  This is a very old idea, probably due to Aristotle. It is also one of the defining notions of 
nineteenth century (pre- and post-Darwinian) embryology, especially for the defenders of 
the idea that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny. See Gould (1977: Part I) for a detailed histo-
rical account. It is fair to say Evo–Devo has rescued and updated this idea. Shubin (2008) 
contains an interesting and accessible revision of the similarities of the genetic and develop-
mental background across the species.  
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These statements do not entail that natural selection is completely neglected by 
Evo–Devoists, who have just opened a discussion concerning the extent of creati-
vity of the Darwinian mechanism relative to that of the constrictions imposed by 
development. Actually, the different Evo–Devo approaches introduced so far 
maintain divergent positions on this issue, ranging from classical “genic select-
ionism” (Carroll 2005) to a radical redefinition of selection, understood as a filter 
rather than as a creative mechanism (see Goodwin 1994 and Kauffman 1995). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A            B 
 
Fig. 3:  Two views on Natural Selection.  
[A. Creative selection. — The unrestricted variation introduced by random point muta-
tions into populations is selected in favor of the variants of those individuals showing 
more resistance to environmental aggression and higher reproductive rates. B. Stabilizing 
selection. — Organic designs resulting from principles and constraints on development 
are filtered attending to their resistance to environmental aggression and their reproduc-
tive success relative to other designs also present in the population.] 
 
 
2.2. Pere Alberch’s Concept of ‘Morphological Evolution’: Principles and 
Applications 
 
The proposals of Pere Alberch concerning the phylogeny of organic designs (or 
‘morphological evolution’) are entirely sympathetic with the core Evo–Devo 
contention: The evolution of the formal patterns of organisms is due to pertur-
bations on the parameters underlying their ontogeny. We start this section by 
presenting his ideas on individual development, strongly connected, in our 
opinion, with those of the most innovative of contemporary Evo–Devoists. 
 As a starting point, Alberch rejects the idea that development could be 
explained as a simple or direct mapping of the genotype onto the phenotype. He 
mutations (noise) 
Natural Selection 
(order) 
Natural 
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(filter) 
•  •   •     •     • 
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defends instead the idea that complex systems of genetic and embryonic factors 
underlie the growth of organisms and that those factors correlate non-linearly 
with the resultant morphologies. This amounts to saying that minor pertur-
bations affecting any of the ‘morphogenetic parameters’ (genetic or non-genetic) 
can introduce wide-ranging consequences on development and, eventually, re-
address the evolutionary course of a whole lineage of organisms. Thus, develop-
mental paths show, according to Alberch, the properties of “complex dynamic 
systems” (see Kelso 1995, as well as the synthesis in Thelen & Smith 1994: chap. 
3), which are summarized in the following points: 
 
(A) A ‘dynamic system of development’ is composed of a high number of 
factors (‘morphogenetic parameters’) of very different characters (genetic, 
cytological, tissular, and so on); 
(B) there is parity in their causal capacities and, thus, none of the factors acts as 
a ‘central control parameter’; 
(C) they establish complex interactions and, consequently, no factor correlates 
directly and exclusively with any particular aspect of the resulting 
phenotype; 
(D) the values of parameters can be subject to continuous perturbations 
without any significant consequence on the phenotype; however, once 
certain ‘critical values’ are attained, small perturbations can be enough to 
trigger a ‘qualitatively new’ morphology; and 
(E) as a consequence of the diversity of causal agents, the complexity of their 
interactions and the non-linear character of their relation with the 
outcomes, identical results can be attained by means of perturbations of the 
values of different parameters of the systems. 
 
In other words, from Alberch’s point of view, neither the course nor the outcome 
of development is ‘preformed’ or ‘programmed’ within genotypes, the inter-
actions among the different parameters at work being non-trivial, and both the 
order of the process and the heftiness of the results being emergent properties of 
the dynamics of the system. Figure 4 captures all these ideas: 
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Fig. 4:  Dynamism and complexity of organic development 
[A. A system of development is characterized by the diversity and causal equality of the 
compounding morphogenetic parameters, the complexity of their interactions and the 
emergent character of the resulting morphologies. B. Once certain critical values have 
been attained, small perturbations on any of the parameters of the system (parameter t, in 
the figure) can result in discontinuous variety (i.e. different and qualitatively new 
designs: X, Y, Z).] 
 
 
 This set of assumptions situates Alberch’s ideas not far from current 
Developmental Systems Theory (DST; see, among other sources, Griffiths & Gray 
1994, Griffiths & Knight 1998, Oyama 2000a, Oyama et al. 2001, and Griffiths & 
Gray 2005), except for two non-negligible details. Alberch, in a strictly internalist 
vein, does not acknowledge the role that DST concedes to environmental factors, 
whereas the idea that opposing ‘organism vs. environment’, ‘nature vs. culture’ 
or ‘internal vs. external’ is completely artefactual is at the core of DST thinking 
(see, particularly, Oyama 2000b). Alberch’s framework, on the contrary, takes 
only morphogenetic parameters of an internal sort into account (rates of kinetic 
activity of cellular diffusion, viscoelastic properties of the cellular matrix, mitotic 
rates, and so on; see, for example, Oster et al. 1988). Furthermore, Alberch points 
out in certain passages (e.g., Alberch 1991: 15) that morphogenetic parameters are 
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ultimately genetically determined, which represents a (somewhat) residual geno-
centric stance. DST, in contrast, abolishes any version of the thesis of the cen-
trality of genes.7 
 Another important component of Alberch’s framework is the relevance of 
the concept of ‘heterochrony’ as the chief mechanism underlying morphological 
changes and evolutionary innovations. A ‘heterochrony’ is basically an alteration 
of the chronogram and/or the rate of growth for unit of time along the process of 
development leading to some significant impact on its final product,8 something 
to which Alberch was very attentive throughout his career (for a very illustrative 
piece, see Alberch & Alberch 1981). Section 3 of our article is devoted to presen-
ting an application of Alberch’s ideas on heterochronies to the special case (not 
considered by him) of the evolution of the nervous system and cognition.9 
 Another very distinctive aspect of Alberch’s model is the idea that systems 
of interactions underlying developmental processes are rather stable and that 
changes in these processes are mostly due to modifications in the values of one or 
another of the morphogenetic parameters of the system (Alberch 1989: 44). Thus, 
neither changes in the system of interactions nor in the nature of interactors 
themselves seems to be needed in order to explain certain major achievements in 
the course of natural evolution.10 In the study of complex dynamic systems, the 
concept of ‘control parameter’ refers to the systemic component whose pertur-
bations correlate with the emergence of new morphologies (a new pattern in the 
surface of a chemical solution, a new embryological state, a new form of beha-
vior, and so on; see Thelen & Smith: 63–64). A control parameter is not, however, 
a central agent in causing phenotypic variation, in that the effects of its pertur-
bations do not immediately reflect on morphological outputs, but on the other 
morphogenetic parameters instead (Kelso 1995: 7; see also Thelen & Smith: 112).11 
                                                
    7  There exists a connection between these two aspects of Alberch’s thinking: The genetic 
determination of morphogenetic parameters presents itself as the only possible reason for 
excluding environmental factors from systems of development. 
    8  ‘Heterochrony’ is a concept that originated with Ernst Haeckel (1834–1919), who used it as 
the conceptual basis of his Biogenetic Law (i.e. the initial stages of embryonic development 
represent the adult states of ancestral organisms). For Haeckel, the only possible heterochro-
nic formula was the acceleration of the appearance of early stages so as to give place to the 
introduction of further stages. The idea that heterochronies can also consist of decelerations 
is due to Gavin de Beer (1899–1972). See Gould (1977: Part I) for a historical view, and Gould 
(1977: Part II) and Alberch et al. (1979) for systematic and formal descriptions of heterochro-
nies. 
    9  Alberch introduced some clarifications of the concept of ‘heterochrony’ in papers such as 
Alberch (1985) and Alberch & Blanco (1996), his intention being to liberate the concept from 
its strong dependency on the idea of ‘time’ and to connect it more directly to the internal 
dynamics of development (see Etxeberria & Nuño de la Rosa, in press). 
    10  Alberch (1991: 17–18) speculates with the idea that this ‘evolutionary mode’ could be an out-
come of natural macro-evolution, naturally selected by its advantageous combination of 
robustness and flexibility: A system of development so defined is very resistant to external 
aggressions, but it also allows the exploration of new designs, eventually needed in relative-
ly or radically unstable environments. 
    11  In Thelen & Smith’s (1994: 112) words, a control parameter “constrain[s] the interacting 
elements, but [does] not prescribe the outcome in a privileged way”. Or in Kelso’s (1995: 7) 
words: “[The] control parameter does not prescribe or contain the code for the emerging 
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Within this model, development (even the development of novel forms) is always 
a function of the system as a whole. The idea of ‘control parameter’ basi-cally 
introduces the possibility of signaling a single parameter of the system as the 
starting point of the chain reaction leading to new morphologies. 
 For our own purposes, however, the most relevant aspect of Alberch’s 
proposals is the contention that developmental systems foreshadow the scope of 
their attainable phenotypes, as well as the trajectories leading from a certain phe-
notypic state to another. It is the concept of ‘parametric space’ that in Alberch’s 
framework is in charge of theoretically representing the finite and discrete set of 
the possible outcomes of any developmental system (Alberch 1989, 1991).12 The 
main properties of parametric spaces are summed up in the following para-
graphs (see Figure 5 below as a point of reference): 
 
(A) A parametric space is a finite set of discrete phenotypes. The discontinuous 
character of phenotypic variation is captured in Figure 5 by the separate 
spaces named with capital letters; 
(B) each phenotype has a characteristic probability of coming into being, repre-
sented in Figure 5 by the extension that it occupies ([D] is thus the most 
probable phenotype, while [B] is the most improbable one); 
(C) moreover, each phenotype is also characterized by the relative probability 
of transforming itself into one or another of the neighboring phenotypes. In 
Figure 5 this aspect is represented by the extension of the line separating 
different phenotypes ([A] has a strong probability of turning into [D], a low 
probability of turning into [B], and no probability at all of turning into any 
of the remaining phenotypes). 
                                                
pattern. It simply leads the system through the variety of possible patterns or states”. 
    12  The notion ‘parameter space’ is related to a certain point to Waddington’s (1957) concept of 
‘epigenetic landscape’. This concept refers to the strong ‘canalization’ of certain 
developmental paths (see fn. 1 of this article), an effect that makes them highly resistant to 
external perturbations. These pathways are thus firmly established and only very radical 
perturbations can serve to redirect development to another less canalized but also 
genetically available path. 
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Figure 5:  Parametric space 
[The figure represents a parametric space ideally defined by means of two morphogenetic 
parameters (x and y). The space delimits a finite number of discontinuous phenotypes (A, 
B, …, F). Perturbations of the values of the parameters can transform a phenotype into 
another. Each phenotype has a characteristic probability of coming into existence (in the 
figure, the space of the relevant phenotype) and a certain propensity of transforming it-
self into another phenotype (in the figure, the extension of the lines limiting phenotypes). 
(Based on Alberch 1989: 51 and Alberch 1991: 16.)] 
 
 
 Moreover, species are represented in Figure 5 by means of the oval items 
(‘s1’ and ‘s2’). From a populational point of view, the model incorporates the fol-
lowing contentions: 
 
(A) Every species falls within one or another phenotype (‘s1’ belongs to pheno-
type [D], whereas ‘s2’ fits in phenotype [A]); 
(B) the morphological stability of a species is a function of both (i) the proba-
bility of its phenotype (‘s1’ is, in principle, a more stable population than 
‘s2’) and (ii) its proximity to a point of bifurcation to other phenotypes (‘s1’ 
is thus a rather unstable population within its phenotype, given its vicinity 
with the bifurcation leading to [E] and [F]); 
(C) the proximity to a point of bifurcation as well as the relative propensity of 
its own phenotype to transform into one or another phenotype puts a cer-
tain population at the edge of undergoing a radical morphological reorga-
nization (‘s1’, for instance, has a high propensity of acquiring the properties 
of phenotype [E]). 
 
‘Bifurcation’, a point within a parametric space in which a minimal perturbation 
is capable of bringing about qualitatively new morphologies, is thus another key 
concept in Alberch’s framework (Oster & Alberch 1982). In Figure 5, for example, 
species s1 can easily shift to phenotype [E], attending to its proximity to the 
A 
B 
C 
D 
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F 
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bifurcation between [F] and [E] from its original phenotype [D], as well as to the 
higher propensity of phenotype [D] for transforming into [E]. Using the jargon of 
dynamic systems theory, we can say that population s2 occupies a ‘well of 
attraction’ in the situation depicted in Figure 5, whose depth guarantees a high 
degree of stability to its phenotype (of type [A]). On the contrary, population s1 is 
at the edge of its well of attraction (i.e. of a ‘phase shift’) due to its continuous 
exposure to a certain kind of perturbing factor, a situation that makes it highly 
susceptible to entering into a different well of attraction. Figure 6 is thus an 
alternative way of symbolizing the situation previously presented in Figure 5. 
Figure 7 summarizes a particular application of this model to the study of an 
entire family of organic structures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6:  Wells of attraction and phase shifts 
[Some morphologies are located in a region of the parametric space that guarantees them 
a high degree of stability in spite of the perturbations of the morphogenetic parameters. 
They occupy a ‘well of attraction’, as it is the case of population s2 within phenotype A. 
On the contrary, some other morphologies are in positions that render them highly 
unstable and exposed to radical changes with a minor perturbation of a single parameter. 
This is the case of population s1, at the edge of undergoing a ‘phase shift’ within pheno-
type D to phenotype E (based on Thelen & Smith 1994: 64).] 
 
A D E 
Control parameter 
(perturbations) 
s2 
s1 
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Figure 7:  Morphogenesis of dermal organs 
[The skin is made of structures (hair, salivary glands, teeth, feathers, scales, limbs and 
carapaces, among others) that are discontinuous from species to species, in the sense that 
no structure can be said to be a transition form between any other two structures. How-
ever, they all originate in equivalent inductive processes having to do with the thickness 
of the epithelium and the concentration of the mesenchymal tissue. Depending on the 
elasticity and the strength obtained in each case, the epithelium can (i) invaginate, giving 
place to hair, glands and teeth, or (ii) evaginate, giving place to feathers, scales or carapa-
ces. Thus, each structure is only accessible through perturbations acting upon a particular 
phenotypic stage in the course of development (see Odell et al. 1981 and Oster & Alberch 
1982; the figure is from Alberch 1989: 47).] 
 
 
 From an evolutionary point of view, an important corollary of  this model 
is that the geometry of parametric spaces, representing forces of an internal sort 
acting upon individual development, works as a very strong constraining force, 
capable of counteracting that of natural selection. As explicitly stated by Alberch, 
although this stance does not discredit the role of natural selection as a filter in 
the evolution of organic designs, it nevertheless strongly decreases the creative 
character that this mechanism has to the adherents of MES-oriented frameworks 
(Alberch 1980: 664, Oster & Alberch 1982: 455, Alberch 1989, 46–48, Alberch 1991: 
16; see also Goodwin 1994: 143 and Wagensberg 2004: 125). 
 In this sense, Alberch’s model connects to an old pre-Darwinian tradition 
known as Transcendental (or Rational) Morphology, with such illustrious repe-
sentative proponents as Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832), Étienne 
Geoffroy Saint–Hilaire (1772–1844), Richard Owen (1802–1892), and Isidore 
Geoffroy Saint–Hilaire (1805–1861); see Russell (1916). In spite of the unequivocal 
empiricist aims of this historical trend, interested in the formal study of orga-
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nisms, its influence on the biology of the twentieth century was truncated 
because of the accusations of Platonism by MES-inspired historiographers (see 
Amundson’s 2007: Part I analysis of this episode of the history of modern bio-
logy). It is our opinion that Alberch’s ideas serve as a clear demonstration that 
the belief in organic types fits perfectly well with a materialistic world view, as 
far as the different types result from natural constrictions and cannot be said to 
be ideal or abstract ideas that are alien to a physical order of things (Amundson 
2001, Love 2003). 
 In connection with this, Alberch emphasized the evolutionary interest of 
the study of developmental monsters (or teratologies), recovering a tradition also 
embraced by Transcendental Morphologists (see Figure 8 below); see especially 
Alberch (1991).13 In Alberch’s opinion, teratologies are demonstrative of the 
strength of development against the pressures of natural selection, in that they 
are, by definition, maladaptive. However, a teratology can be the basis of organic 
novelties with a potentially evolutionary import.14 Furthermore, the range of pos-
sible teratologies seems to be very strictly constrained (for example, duplication, 
but not triplication, of structures is common in abnormal development). This fact 
points to the existence of strong constraining forces on development not directly 
coming from natural selection (see Figure 9 below). 
                                                
    13  See Geoffroy Saint–Hilaire (1822) and Geoffroy Saint–Hilaire (1832-1837). 
    14  Alberch (1989: 28) points out that the evolutionary potential of teratologies can be rather 
limited. Anyhow, he observes that it would be an error to discard them as a possible source 
of raw material for the evolutionary process. In his own words (Alberch 1980: 656):   
The argument that most developmental anomalies are harmful, commonly 
used to ‘discredit’ the relevance of these ‘mutations’ to evolution, is fallacious. 
Most genetic mutations were once thought to be deleterious (presently it is 
recognized the most of them appear to be selectively neutral, but that does not 
affect my argument), however nobody doubts that they provide the raw 
material for evolutionary change.  
 Alberch’s position is thus not far from that of Richard Goldschmidt (1933, 1940: 390–393): 
“Mutants producing monstrosities may have played a considerable role in macroevolution. 
A monstrosity appearing in a single genetic step might permit the occupation of a new 
environmental niche and thus produce a new type in one step” (Goldschmidt 1940: 390). 
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Figure 8:  The logic of monsters (I) 
[“After having studied anomalies in their special conditions and established the laws and 
general relations underlying all particular facts, I will demonstrate the way in which 
these laws and relations are but corollaries of even more general laws of organization; 
[…] the way in which […] many principles established on very weak evidence find in 
anomalies a complete demonstration. And the way in which teratology, among its many 
concerns, covers every single condition of the organization of life” (Geoffroy Saint–
Hilaire 1832–1837, vol. I: xi; our translation — SB & GL).] 
 
 
 
 
   
 
Figure 9:  The logic of monsters (II) 
[“Monsters are a good system to study the internal properties of generative rules. They 
represent forms which lack adaptative function while preserving structural order. An 
analysis of monsters is a study of pure form” (Alberch 1989: 23). “These major deviations 
from normal development result in forms that are often lethal, and always significantly 
less well adapted than their progenitors. Therefore, one expects monsters to be consis-
tently eliminated by selection. This is a useful property because if, in spite of very strong 
negative selection, teratologies are generated in a discrete and recurrent manner, this 
order has to be a reflection of the internal properties of the developmental system” 
(Alberch 1989: 28).] 
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 Anyway, Alberch did not contend that natural selection was to be deprived 
of any creative role in evolution. Actually, he noted that natural selection biases 
evolution just by filtering out those designs unable to withstand populational 
and environmental pressures, thus having the effect of directing the process 
towards the morphologies accessible from the selected designs. Therefore, 
natural selection is continuously determining the probability of the presence of 
certain organic designs at future stages of evolution, an unequivocal creative 
intervention on the evolutionary process (Alberch 1989: 46 and Maynard Smith et 
al. 1985: 270). 
 
 
3. The Evolution of Grammar through the Development of the Mind 
 
“If the ideas that make up Evo–Devo have been so productive in opening up new 
lines of investigation into morphological evolution, they may be equally 
productive for psychological evolution”. These words by Paul Griffiths (2007: 
196) are particularly well suited to mark the transition of our work, so far 
devoted to an exposition of the theoretical underpinnings of Evolutionary 
Developmental Biology in the field in which it has become a mature scientific 
discipline — that is, in the field of the evolution of the formal patterns followed 
by organisms, to the study of a specific aspect of the evolution of human 
cognition. 
 Griffiths reminds us that, inasmuch as cognition is just another dimension 
of the organic world, there is no principled reason for not extending the core 
theses of Evo–Devo to this domain. Indeed, to the extent that we eschew any hint 
of ‘mind/body’ dualism, the fact is that there exists a perfectly natural path to 
extend and apply these ideas to the field of the evolution of mind. Taking then 
what in any case appears to be the most logical assumption, if what we call 
‘mind’ — or ‘cognition’, as, for the purposes of this article both terms can be 
taken as synonymous — is nothing else than what “the brain does”, to use a well-
known expression by Searle (1985), it is obvious that the study of the morpho-
logical evolution of the brain is a first step towards the evolutionary study of 
mental functions. It is also clear therefore that the evolutionary study of the brain 
qua organic structure and, specifically, the evolutionary study of its formal diver-
sity among the species endowed with complex nervous systems presents itself as 
a natural field of application for Evo–Devo. 
 It goes without saying, however, that the evolution of brain morphology is 
just a part of a broader Evo–Devo agenda, aiming at the investigation of the 
evolution of mental functions. In this sense, it may be useful to distinguish three 
different levels of analysis, all involved in the study of such functions, and briefly 
to consider in these preliminary remarks their positions within the kind of evolu-
tionary explanations specifically devoted to the phenomena of development. The 
three levels are: (i) brain anatomy, (ii) brain function, and (iii) observable beha-
vior. 
 As for the first level (brain anatomy), we already pointed out that, for Evo–
Devo, it just is a specific area of application within its broader research program 
centered on the evolution of formal organic patterns. As a matter of fact, there 
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already exists a number of very interesting findings, such as those reported in 
Parker et al. (2000), Falk & Gibson (2001), and Minugh–Purvis & McNamara 
(2001), for example, just to restrict ourselves to the evolution of the primate brain. 
 As for the second level (brain function), this is where most problems tradi-
tionally associated with the study of mind are concentrated. In this work we will 
assume, as already pointed out, that when talking about the mind we are talking 
about the functions related to brain activity. Therefore, this level adds up a new 
level of analysis whose phenomenology goes way beyond the mere facts of brain 
morphology. Nevertheless, the fact that, at this level, most theoretical approaches 
tackle the study of brain function abstracting away from its physical realization 
does not mean that it is really abstract and with irreducible properties to its 
material base.15 Thus, we share point of view of Noam Chomsky, who in his 
works has argued that framing an explanation on a strictly physicalist language 
or using an abstract vocabulary to talk about these matters is just a mere question 
of perspective, and that decisions must be made simply on the basis of practical 
issues, such as the accessibility to observation of the considered domain or the 
significance of directly observable data (see, for example, Chomsky 1980). Also, 
from the Chomskyan point of view, similar considerations dictate that in the 
study of higher cognitive functions in humans there often prevails a computa-
tional and more abstract approach. Whatever the most convenient or just possible 
approach that one may take, the truth is that the exploration of the putative 
modifications in brain function regarding such aspects as the timing of the onset 
and stabilization of brain development, its maturation rhythms, the alteration of 
intermediate states or of the terminal state, and so on appear to us as topics 
which fit perfectly well within the Evo–Devo agenda. 
 Finally, we come to the study of observable behavior, which for a long time 
was the alibi of twentieth-century behaviorist psychology to attain the kind of 
scientific respectability imposed by the dominant positivist ideology in the philo-
sophy of science. Curiously enough, Amundson (2006) suggests that transition of 
theoretical psychology towards a more cognitivist approach is, historically, 
comparable to the deliverance of Evo–Devo from the narrow-minded perspective 
imposed by the MES. In both cases, so Amundson argues, we observe a transition 
from an approach focused on environmental conditioning factors to a perspective 
where the search for internal constraints prevails. As Amundson himself 
suggests, such a situation may well be interpreted in the sense that both Evo–
Devo and cognitive psychology are the products of the same zeitgeist, which 
should favor the convergence of both scientific approaches, along the lines of 
what we sketch in the previous paragraph. 
 All these considerations notwithstanding, we believe that the study of 
behavior must not be eschewed in order to favor only the study of internalist 
issues. As a matter of fact, the kinds of explanations based on the interaction 
among multiple domains which are generally favored within Evo–Devo make us 
believe (i) that in the application of this discipline to the realm of cognition none 
of the three aforementioned levels must be privileged over the others, and (ii) 
                                                
    15  But see the introduction to Fodor (1975) for an alternative point of view, and Churchland 
(1981) for the defense of a radically different stance from the one adopted in this paper. 
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that such an application may foster the formulation of complex interactions in 
different directions among these levels, such that these very same interactions 
may be seen as the locus of alterations in development with a potentially evolu-
tionary significance (Figure 10). Indeed, the fact that specific environmentally 
induced alterations in the behavior of an organism during its development may 
be the basis of further modifications of the anatomic, physiologic and, eventually, 
genetic determining factors capable of inducing a new behavioral pattern is a 
non-problematic idea in the context of Evo–Devo and one that has contributed to 
vindicate certain models of change — such as ‘organic selection’ or ‘genetic 
assimilation’, which apparently stand in direct contradiction with the dominant 
genocentric logic of the MES, by letting in the Lamarckian ghost of the inheri-
tance of acquired characters.16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10:  Evolution and behavior 
[Interactive model with multiple levels of development and activity in higher organisms 
(based on Plotkin & Odling–Smee 1981; see also Johnston & Edwards 2002 for a still more 
complex model in terms of levels and interaction loops, and in terms of the specified 
morphogenetic parameters). In this model, the intergenerational recurrence of alterations 
within a specific behavioral pattern may have evolutionary repercussions, either through 
a novel redistribution of the dominant alleles in the genetic pool of the population 
(‘genetic assimilation’) or through the selection of new mutations that occurred in it 
(‘organic selection’).] 
                                                
    16  For a synthesis of these ideas and models, see Gottlieb (2003: 14–23). The original references 
for each of them are Baldwin (1896), Morgan (1896), Osborn (1897), and Waddington (1953), 
respectively. Longa (2006) is an interesting clarification of the ideas of these authors, often 
wrongly identified in certain recent applications of the so called ‘Baldwin Effect’ to the 
evolution of language. Jablonka & Lamb (1995) is a recent vindication of the ‘Lamarckian 
dimension’ in evolutionary biology. 
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3.1. The Evolution of the Brain through Development 
 
The application of the Evo–Devo assumptions to the particular case of a species’ 
psychological endowment in essence implies trying to find out what alterations 
in the development of the mind/brain of the organism might be capable of intro-
ducing into the population to which the organisms in question belong a heritable 
variety, eventually capable of making them fitter with respect to the rest of the 
population. In the light of the ideas exposed in Section 2 of this article, if we are 
to find any illuminating answers, this task involves taking into account the fol-
lowing four key points: 
 
(A) Identify the morphogenetic parameters which make up the developmental 
system of a particular feature of the mind/brain; 
(B) identify the control parameter or parameters whose perturbation acts as a 
trigger for change; 
(C) specify the constraints imposed by the developmental system itself, defin-
ing parametrical spaces of possibilities; and 
(D) elucidate the populational and environmental conditions capable of filter-
ing the distribution of phenotypes within the population and favoring the 
resulting solution of the process of change in question. 
 
That said, we will devote the following paragraphs to briefly discussing a 
number of important contributions connected to the issue of the study of the evo-
lution of human cognition in any of its dimensions (i.e. structure, function, and 
behavior). As we already hinted in section 2, all share the assumption that one 
form or another of ‘heterochrony’ is the basic mechanism able, just as in the case 
of morphology,17 to explain the evolution of the human nervous system and 
cognition, which would thus be a product of some alteration in timing and/or 
intensity of development of closely related species (Table 1). 
 
                                                
    17  As stated by Gould (1977: 4):  
Evolution occurs when ontogeny is altered in one of two ways: when new 
characters are introduced at any stage of development with varying effects 
upon subsequent stages, or when characters already present undergo changes 
in developmental timing. Together, these two processes exhaust the formal 
content of phyletic change; the second process is heterochrony. 
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Heterochrony. Evolution through changes in developmental timing and 
intensity. Types: 
1. Paedomorphosis (underdevelopment or terminal truncation). 
Subtypes: 
1.a. Reduced rate of development (neoteny); 
1.b. Earlier offset (progenesis); and 
1.c. Delayed onset (postdisplacement). 
2. Peramorphosis (overdevelopment or terminal extension). Subtypes: 
2.a. Increased rate of development (acceleration); 
2.b. Delayed offset (hypermorphosis); and 
2.c. Earlier onset (predisplacement). 
  
Table 1:  Heterochrony: Definition and types 
[Based on McKinney (2000) and Parker & McKinney (1999); other sources: Gould (1977), 
McKinney & McNamara (1991), and Alba (2002).] 
 
 In the study of the evolution of mind, brain structure as the result of trans-
formations that have occurred in the ontogeny of organisms is the most studied 
area. This is not at all surprising, as it is the domain which stands closest to the 
typical body of applications of Evo–Devo. As a consequence of that, one may 
take as an established fact, for example, that both larger brain size and connec-
tivity rate among its components (especially, but not exclusively, at the cellular 
level) may result from alterations at very early stages of embryonic development. 
In this connection, Kaskan & Finlay (2001) point out that an increased rate of 
production of precursor cells or an extension of cytogenesis during embryonic 
development may result in significant differences in brain size. These authors, in 
fact, define ‘cytogenesis’ as the period spanning from a point where production 
of precursor cells of some structure starts to the point where a maximum of cell 
division obtains and the resulting cell does not divide but ‘migrates’ to the 
forming structure (Kaskan & Finlay 2001: 17). They note moreover that in the 
development of different brain structures from the neural tube of mammals one 
observes clear displacements once the highest point of such asymmetric terminal 
divisions is reached. Finally, they also contend that in each case the resulting 
neural population grows exponentially with respect to the displacement of this 
peak (Figure 11). 
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Figure 11:  Extension of cytogenesis and exponential growth of brain structures 
[The temporal extension of this ‘summit’ of asymmetric cellular divisions causes an 
exponential increment in the population of resulting neurons. The charts above show 
how such displacement is generalized in the cytogenesis of different brain structures in 
primates (right) compared to the homologous structures in rodents (left). They show 
moreover that a greater displacement in the formation of the cortex (C) results in an 
increased neural population for this structure, much larger than that for other structures, 
such as the spinal chord (A) or the basal anterior brain (B); this increment has an 
exponential character. (Taken from Kaskan & Finlay 2001: 20.)] 
 
 
 Rakic & Kornack (2000), for their part, offer some interesting quantifi-
cations. They point out that the phase of asymmetric cell division yielding to 
neural cells (that is, the phase to which peak Kaskan & Finlay refer to) starts in 
monkeys some four weeks later than in mice, which entails an extension of the 
period of symmetric cell division, where the majority of neural precursors are 
produced. According to the data presented by these authors, as a result of this 
displacement on the onset of a characteristic phase of embryonic development, 
the population of neurons in monkeys doubles that of mice. Moreover, as Rakic 
& Kornack (2001: 45–46) point out, in the case of humans the onset of asymmetric 
cell division is displaced only a few days later than that of monkeys, but, given 
the exponential effect of such displacement on the production of neural precur-
sors, the population of neurons in humans is estimated to be between some eight 
or sixteen times larger than that of monkeys. In the light of these data, the 
authors conclude that the mutation of some regulatory gene (or a collection 
thereof) may have been responsible for the reorganization of the neo-cortex and 
of the cognitive and behavioral novelties associated with it (Rakic & Kornack 
days days 
N
eural population 
N
eural population 
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2001: 46).18 
 It must be taken into account, however, that this is not the only known dif-
ference in the developmental pattern of the human brain as compared to that of 
monkeys. Parker & McKinney (1999) and McKinney (2000), for example, contend 
that (i) fetal growth of the human brain is 25 days longer than that of monkeys, 
(ii) myelinization of the neo-cortex (and, especially that of the frontal cortex) is 
extended in humans until the age of 12, whereas in rhesus monkeys it lasts only 
3.5 years, or (iii) dendritic growth is extended in humans until the age of 20, well 
beyond that of any other of its close kindred species. All these cases have to do 
with factors affecting the neural interconnectivity rate and their combined effect 
must no doubt have some far reaching consequences, as explicitly argued for by 
Parker & McKinney (1999) in their comprehensive comparative study of cogni-
tive development in monkeys, apes and humans. 
 It is also relevant to point out, however, that the alterations of develop-
mental phases with direct repercussions on the proliferation of neural precursors 
or on the interconnection of the resulting neural populations cannot bring about 
a totally unconstrained type of growth or of brain reorganization. Metabolic and 
energetic limitations aside — which are in any case an important factor in limi-
ting brain capacity — Hofman (2001) reasons that certain aspects of the Bauplan 
followed by the primate brain impose limiting constraints on its evolutionary 
potential. He points out, for example, that the exponential character of the incre-
ment of the cortical mass with respect to cerebral mass as a whole is not observed 
in other brain structures (all playing a relevant role in regulating cortical connec-
tivity, such as the cerebellum, the basal ganglia, etc.), where growth follows a 
linear pattern. As a consequence of that, the more the brain grows, the more dis-
proportionate is the relation between cortical mass and these structures, which 
will eventually be inadequate for processing the same kind of complex 
information the cortex would be able to process (Hofman 2001: 115–119). Besides, 
Hofman contends that there are limitations on axon length which may cancel out 
the effects of an increased cortical mass, for the simple and practical reason that it 
could not be supplied with the appropriate wiring to ensure the connection bet-
ween areas distant from each other in the cortex. Hofman points out that this 
may be the underlying cause for the compartmentalization of the cortex into 
specialized areas or modules within which highly interconnected neurons are 
concentrated.19 A disproportionate growth of the brain would, in any case, bring 
the issue back to the level of inter-modular wiring which is necessary to support 
the characteristic flexibility of human-like cognition (Hofman 2001: 119–124). 
 Findings such as these provide additional support to the idea that alter-
ations in brain development may be at the basis of the evolution of human 
cognition, and that factors such as the significance of genetic regulation as a 
                                                
    18  In this connection, we find promising some recent findings pointing at genes which regulate 
certain phases of brain growth (see Dorus et al. 2004). In connection with some of them, like 
Microcephalin, relatively recent mutations specific to modern humans have also been identi-
fied (see Evans et al. 2004 and Evans et al. 2005); for a comprehensive overview of the genes 
implied in brain development and growth, see Benítez Burraco (2009: chap. 3). 
    19  See Griffiths (2007) for a defense of the concept of ‘modularity’ in the application of Evo–
Devo to the study of mind. 
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particularly relevant control parameter, or the role of allometry as a constraint on 
possible phenotypic spaces constitute a serious hypothesis and are of major 
importance in this research. Unfortunately, they are rather uninformative at the 
time of concocting an explanation at the level of the resulting mental functions 
and their reflection on specific behavioral patterns. This point is not only relevant 
for the definition of parametric spaces of brain functionality, but also because, as 
we already pointed out, the identification of some specific population within one 
space or another may in turn have repercussions on the evolution of the morpho-
genetic parameters delimiting these spaces. 
 In this connection, and deserving of special attention, there already exists 
an important line of research focusing on the study of mental function as a result 
of alterations in developmental systems which adopts a comparative perspective 
similar to that of the works cited above.20 Thus, for example, Langer (2000) 
compares physical and logico-mathematical intelligence in humans, chimpanzees 
and monkeys, whence he derives a series of conclusions about the onset and 
culmination of the development of such cognitive abilities in these species and, 
additionally, about the relative intensity of its progress in each case. The most 
fundamental conclusion derived from this comparison is that, evolutionarily 
speaking, there appears to have occurred an early onset and an acceleration in 
the development of these cognitive dimensions (particularly pronounced in the 
case of logico-mathematical intelligence), as well as a synchronization of the 
processes involved, favoring a mutual inter-penetrability with clear reper-
cussions on how the surrounding world is conceived and explained. Langer 
specifically points out that the emergence of physical intelligence takes place 
early in all cases, but logico-mathematical intelligence in monkeys appears only 
after maturation of the former has been completed; this happens only a bit earlier 
in chimpanzees, while in humans both processes are entirely synchronized. 
Langer moreover contends that certain particularly complex aspects of human 
cognition, such as the ability to perform specific mental operations in an inte-
grated and simultaneous way (e.g., deal with two sets of objects, compare them 
and redistribute their elements to make them identical) are an effect of this 
pattern of premature, accelerated and synchronized development of the afore-
mentioned abilities. Lastly, Langer observes that the development of these 
abilities in humans goes well beyond that of the species taken as a point of com-
parison, which takes him to speak about a model of cognitive evolution through 
“overdevelopment” or “terminal extension” (Langer 2000: 229). As he himself 
emphasizes, this conclusion is particularly interesting, since it is consistent with 
the hypothesis of a parallel process of overdevelopment at the level of brain 
structure, with an equal involvement of different aspects of brain anatomy (ex-
tended growth of glial cells, axon myelinization, synaptogenesis, and dendritic 
growth in the cortex) (Langer 2000: 227). As a whole, this is clearly an important 
step in the establishment of bridges between the neural and the mental levels.21 
 The next section of this article may be seen as an attempt to put forth some 
                                                
    20  See also the work by Parker & McKinney (1999) cited above, as a key reference in this 
direction. 
    21  See Gibson (1990, 2004) as additional representative references in this direction. 
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concrete proposals within this same line of thought regarding human cognition 
as an effect of the evolutionary history of its developmental pattern. We try to 
bridge the gap as much as possible between the physical and functional levels of 
analysis. We will be concerned with a particular aspect of the human mind, 
namely the computational system associated with the FL. We will more con-
cretely explore the kinds of morphogenetic perturbations that may be the cause 
of its origin; also, and from a representational and abstract perspective, we will 
suggest a localization for such a system within a parametric space of possibilities, 
and the network of bifurcations leading to the position that it occupies today. 
Finally, we will also suggest some ideas about the environmental and popu-
lational conditions that may have made this system possible, while filtering out 
other alternatives within the same parametric space. 
 
3.2. A Model of the Evolution of the Nervous System and Cognition: Para-
metric Space and Computational Phenotypes 
 
As was mentioned at the end of the preceding section, there are not very many 
proposals where an explicit connection is established between the development 
of new neural structures and novel cognitive abilities. In this section, we will try 
to tackle this problem by sketching a proposal built on the principles of Evo–
Devo, where we apply Alberch’s notion of parametric space to different possible 
phenotypes of the nervous system and where we associate each possible pheno-
type with specific computational properties. 
 To the extent that “development of form cannot be straightforwardly 
related to genetic change, because the relation of function to new morphologic 
structures is not simple or direct” (Edelman 1988: 156), any proposal along these 
lines should, on the one hand, seek to determine what morphogenetic parameters 
make up the developmental system and, on the other hand, define the space of 
possible phenotypes on the basis of each and every parameter of the system. For 
expository reasons we will, however, limit ourselves to representing parametric 
spaces on a bi-dimensional plane, adopting Alberch’s convention of considering 
only two ‘abstract’ parameters — x and y — from which one should be able to 
define the phenotypes in question. Additionally, and despite the considerable 
progress in the study of the different factors involved in embryonic development 
in general and in the development of the nervous system in particular, it would 
at present be practically impossible for us to precisely pinpoint all these factors: 
The fact is that many important aspects of the process still remain a mystery. We 
can nevertheless assert that these factors are not only and exclusively of a genetic 
nature and, as is made explicitly clear in the proposed models (see, for example, 
Edelman 1988, for development in general, and Edelman 1987 and Ebesson 1980 
for the development of the nervous system), such factors cover a wide spectrum 
of elements. For example, in Edelman’s topobiologic model, the main develop-
mental processes are cell division, cell movement, and cell death, the driving 
forces of the whole process, with cell adhesion and differentiation acting as 
regulatory processes. It is important to point out, however, that these processes, 
which are responsible for building and giving form to an organism, are the result 
of a complex balance between genetics and epigenetics. Indeed, as emphasized 
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by Edelman (1987: chap. 4), the development of the brain is one of those cases 
where special attention must be paid to epigenetic mechanisms, since, although 
the anatomical structures in specific brain areas in individuals belonging to a 
particular species are very similar and therefore their development must obey 
some specific genetic constraints, it is also true that an extremely high degree of 
variation is observed at the levels of neuronal morphology and neural patterning, 
especially at the level of axonal and dendritic branching. It goes without saying 
that such a degree of variation can only be the result of epigenetic factors acting 
during development on what Edelman calls the “primary repertoire” with a 
genetic basis (but also variable). As the process moves forward, new elements of 
variation are introduced, particularly at the synaptic level, in the form of changes 
in the biochemical structure and the appearance of an increasing number of dif-
ferent neurotransmitters. It is obvious, then, that a process of this kind possesses 
enormous potential for the introduction of morphological novelties, and even 
more so if we factor in the possibility that it be affected by some kind of hetero-
chrony altering developmental timing and rate of growth.22 
 A developmental system of this kind, with a high creative potential, is not, 
however, totally unconstrained. Remember, in this respect, Hofman’s (2001) con-
siderations about the structural and connectivity restrictions that constrain the 
space of possible phenotypes for the nervous system of an organism, and which 
are, moreover, the kinds of constraints over form alluded to by several scholars 
since the beginning of the nineteenth century as the basic ingredient to explain 
the phenomenon of form.23 In accordance with this stance, we understand that it 
is perfectly licit to assume that the developmental system of the nervous system 
defines a finite set of possible phenotypes, in such a way that a specific organism 
might have access to any of them, should the necessary perturbations to remodel 
it or relocate it in a new position occur. In addition, and coming back to our dis-
cussion concerning the different levels of analysis in the study of cognition, we 
propose to extend such distinctions to the realm of parametric spaces, such that, 
in parallel to the morphological parametric space, another parametric space 
would exist with what we may call a collection of ‘cognitive phenotypes’, where 
to every phenotype in the space of forms there corresponds a unique cognitive 
phenotype.24 
 Even though an exhaustive and detailed characterization of all the defining 
properties of a specific morphological phenotype is impossible, at least we have 
                                                
    22  See Edelman (1987: chap. 6) for a concrete proposal along these lines. 
    23  The most significant — and radical — representative of this line of thought is, without 
doubt, D’Arcy Thompson (1860–1948), who presented his ideas in his monumental On 
Growth and Form (D’Arcy Thompson 1917). It is possible, however, to identify similar ideas 
in the thought of earlier authors, such as Richard Owen (see Owen 1848: 102–106) and, in 
particular, William Bateson (1861–1926) (see Bateson 1894). Webster & Goodwin (1996) is 
perhaps the most comprehensive an detailed exposition of the theoretical and empirical 
underpinnings of contemporary ‘Generative Biology’; see also Goodwin (1994). 
    24  Note that it is not strictly necessary that the number of morphological phenotypes be equal 
to the number of cognitive phenotypes. In fact, we deem it perfectly reasonable to assume 
that this is not the case and that a single cognitive phenotype may be associated with more 
than one morphological phenotype or, in other words, that different morphologies may be 
susceptible of an identical abstract characterization. 
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at our disposal a powerful theoretical tool that makes it possible to identify its 
main features at the computational level, and to elaborate concrete proposals 
about what structures and neural organizations could be associated with these 
properties. In concrete terms, we will assume that the parametric space of cogni-
tive phenotypes contains a minimum of four phenotypes, in direct correspon-
dence with the four levels of computational complexity of the Chomsky 
Hierarchy (Figure 12). We speak of a minimum of four phenotypes, because we 
will for the moment stick to the original version of the Hierarchy (Chomsky 
1959). We are perfectly aware, however, that at a later date new levels were 
added to it. For example, Chomsky himself argued soon after for the necessity of 
distinguishing between strict context-sensitive systems and systems capable of 
generating any recursive system (Chomsky 1963); Aho (1968) described indexed 
systems within the complexity space originally reserved to type 1 systems (see 
also Hopcroft & Ullman 1979: chap. 14), whereas Aravind Joshi and collaborators 
(see Joshi 1985, Joshi et al. 1991, and Vijay–Shanker & Weir 1994) added new com-
partments to this space with the extended context-free systems or, alternatively, 
mild context-sensitive systems. What follows, however, does not particularly 
hinge on the exact number of phenotypes (although we will come back to these 
new developments) and, for ease of exposition, we will stick to a parametric 
space with four phenotypes, without forgetting that human language would be 
somewhere within the ‘lower’ area of type 1 systems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12:  The Chomsky Hierarchy (Chomsky 1959) 
[The Chomsky Hierarchy defines a scale of systems with an increasing generative power, 
and capable of generating different types of recursive sets whose elements show 
increasing levels of complexity (type 3 to type 1), and, eventually, any type of recursively 
enumerable set (type 0).] 
 
 
 In Figure 13 we sketch our proposed parametric space of cognitive — or, 
better perhaps, computational — phenotypes. In the figure, we label the pheno-
types as FC3, FC2, FC1, and FC0 in correspondence with the four levels of the 
Type 0 
Type 1 
Type 2 
Type 3 
Unrestricted systems 
Context-sensitive systems 
Context-free 
 systems 
Regular systems 
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Chomsky Hierarchy; with arrows we indicate the possible transitions between 
one space and another. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13:  The parametric space of Chomskyan computational phenotypes 
[Each computational phenotype occupies a specific area within the space brought about 
by the interaction of the morphogenetic parameters involved in cognitive development 
(here just two idealized parameters x and y). Once one or more parameters — the control 
parameter(s) — attain some critical value, the conditions are met for a ‘jump’ (arrows) 
within the space of possibilities. This kind of figure (which Alberch also used in his 
writings) differs slightly from the one we used before for representing parametric spaces 
(Figure 5), because it remains silent as to the relative probability of a jump from one 
phenotype to another. The larger or smaller surface of a phenotype still represents, 
however, its greater or smaller relative stability and, consequently, the probability of its 
occurrence. Finally, as for the absence of arrows pointing toward the FC0 phenotype, this 
is our way to capture the idea that there may not exist any possible developmental path 
leading to it. Contrary to what it may seem at first blush, this is not at all problematic. As 
pointed out by Rasskin–Gutman (2005: 214–215), we must distinguish between (i) a 
‘theoretical morphospace’, including possible (both actual and potential) and impossible 
phenotypes, and (ii) an ‘empirical morphospace’, excluding the latter. Its exclusion is 
justified by natural limitations on the parametric factors involved.] 
 
 
 Note, then, that, despite the fact of not having a precise characterization of 
phenotypes at the morphological level (but see section 3.3 below for some pro-
posals in this direction), we do have a precise computational characterization of 
our computational phenotypes. In fact, whatever the specific morphological 
properties of a phenotype, we know that, if it is associated with phenotype FC3, 
its computational power will be equivalent to a finite-state automaton; if it is 
associated with FC2, it will be equivalent to a push-down automaton; if it is asso-
ciated with FC1, it will be equivalent to a linear-bounded automaton; and, finally, 
if it is associated with FC0, it will be equivalent to a Turing machine. 
 Observe, moreover, that the parametric space of cognitive computational 
y 
x 
FC3 
FC2 
FC1 
FC0 
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phenotypes possesses the very same properties as the morphospaces proposed 
by Alberch in his works. That is, it shows a non-continuous distribution of phe-
notypic variation, with discrete and easily identifiable states. Thus, the transition 
from one state to another is, in fact, a ‘jump’ that is only made possible once a 
specific critical point is attained (possibly as a result of the accumulation of small 
gradual changes). As a consequence, just as in Alberch’s model there is no sense 
to be made of the phrase “being between phenotype A and phenotype B”, in ours 
one cannot describe a system whose computational regime is somewhere in 
between, say, a finite-state system (FC3) and a context-free system (FC2). It is 
nevertheless important to take into account that, as already pointed out by 
Bateson (1894), the fact that there is discontinuity in variation is not in contra-
diction with the idea of gradual change at the level of processes; this is, in fact, a 
fundamental feature of the concept of ‘critical-point emergence’ to which we 
shall appeal here (see Reid 2007: chap. 8, for details). According to our proposal, 
then, the evolution of what we call ‘the computational mind’ would have con-
sisted in a historical process where complex interactions among genetic and epi-
genetic factors during the individual developmental process of the nervous 
system would have given rise to qualitatively differentiated phenotypes via a 
sequence of ‘critical-point’ emergent processes. Such phenotypes would have 
been able to act as the material support for richer computational regimes, and 
one of these ‘jumps’, the one leading to a computational regime of type 1 (FC1), 
would have been the one that made possible the emergence of human language. 
 Before sketching our proposal for an evolutionary scenario, to which we 
turn presently, we would like to devote some space to describe some of the most 
important properties of the different systems and of the different computational 
regimes capable of generating them. We shall begin with the less relevant ones 
(type 0 systems), which will additionally serve as a justification for our having 
relegated them to the realm of impossible phenotypes within theoretical morpho-
space. Next, we turn to the remaining cognitive phenotypes, much more relevant 
for our purposes. 
 Chomsky (1959: 126–127) has already pointed out that we could not learn 
much about language if its elements are specified in the form of “such ‘un-
structured’ devices as general Turing machines”. In order to grasp the essence of 
this assertion, it may be relevant to recall some basic aspects of the mathematical 
theory of recursive functions, to which the theory of computation is intimately 
related.25 
 Remember, first, that, as stated in the caption of Figure 12, a Turing 
machine has the power of generating any recursively enumerable set, that is, any 
finite or infinite set that may be put in a one-to-one relation with the set N of 
natural numbers. This implies that, if some set A is enumerable, then a bijective 
function f exists assigning to every element of A an element of the set N, and, 
consequently, that the cardinal of A is, at most, ℵ0, that is, equal to the cardinal of 
                                                
    25  To be precise, we should have written ‘µ-recursive functions’. The thesis that µ-recursive 
functions and Turing machines are equivalent is traditionally known as Church’s Thesis or 
the Church–Turing Thesis; on this topic and for a large part of what is discussed in the text, 
see Lewis & Papadimitriou (1981). 
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the set of natural numbers. The property of being recursively enumerable 
implies, therefore, the theoretical possibility of counting the elements in the set, 
such that all finite sets plus all infinite sets (or also the finite ones) sharing with N 
the (crucial) property of being recursive are recursively enumerable. This point is 
crucial, because, from the enumerability of a set one may not necessarily deduce 
its recursivity (although the reverse is always true: Any recursive set is enumer-
able). In this case, one must resort to a different class of recursive functions, 
namely those which, given an arbitrary element x, are capable of returning a 
result of 1 or 0 (or True or False), such that, if the result is 1, then x ∈ A, and, if 
the result is 0, then x ∉ A. Note that, now, it is not a matter of counting the 
elements of a set, but of deciding (or generating) what are the elements of that set 
and, indirectly, those of its complement.26 From this it follows that the set N of 
natural numbers is an ideal model to deal with these issues, since we know that it 
is enumerable (we can put it in a relation to itself to count it) and that there is a 
finitely definable procedure capable of generating it (for example, Peano’s 
axioms).27 The notion of a finitely definable procedure brings us to the point at 
which we can add a third fundamental element to Church’s Thesis, which asserts 
that any µ-recursive function may be imitated by a Turing machine (and vice-
versa). This third element asserts that a Turing machine may be imitated by a re-
writing system or grammar, understood as a system of rules the recursive appli-
cation of which allows us to put a string of symbols in a relation with another 
string of symbols.28 
 And thus we come to the point where Chomsky’s words quoted above can 
be clearly interpreted. The family of rewriting systems equivalent to a Turing 
machine is the family of unrestricted rewriting systems, that is, those systems 
whose rules can put strings of an arbitrary length into a relationship with strings 
of an arbitrary length. With no constraints on the nature of rules, any rewriting 
system may be able to generate any set of strings of symbols, such that, for 
example, the set of all strings made up by the iteration of any instance of the 
symbol a, which we can abbreviate as a* (any sequence of zero or more as), might 
be generated by a system of rules like S → ε, S → a, S → aa, S → aaa, and so forth, 
where ε represents the empty string. Clearly, this is not a finitely definable procedure 
to generate the set a*. This is perfectly natural for a computational device like a 
Turing machine, since it has, after all, an unlimited amount of time and space 
available to carry out its work; but it is not so for us, because what we want is a 
finite device for generating the elements of a set (such as, for example, the set of 
sentences of a natural language), and the simple fact that a set is recursively enu-
merable is not a guarantee of the existence of such a procedure. The only family 
of sets for which we know for certain that such a procedure exists is recursive 
                                                
    26  Which moreover implies that, if set A is recursive, both A and its complement are recur-
sively enumerable, but not, of course, that the complement is also recursive. 
    27  Or, to be precise, Peano’s ninth axiom of his Arithmetices principia (1889) or Principle of 
Induction, which defines the successor function σ, such that σ(n) = n+1 for all n ∈ N, and 
which is one of the primitive recursive functions from which it is possible to define all other 
recursive functions, including the µ-recursive functions. 
    28  What Church’s Thesis states, therefore, is that the three ways of understanding the idea of 
computation — recursive functions, automata, and grammars — are strictly equivalent. 
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sets. This is not, however, the only problem posed by unrestricted rewriting 
systems, as — and returning to the case of the set a* — we see that what we have 
just demonstrated is that a Turing machine is able to give an extensional defi-
nition of the set, that is, that it is able to enumerate each and every element of the 
set, but nothing else. This is what Chomsky refers to when he says that these 
systems are ‘unstructured’: A mere list of its elements tells us nothing about the 
properties of the elements of the set, when, in the case of natural language, for 
example, we are not only interested in knowing whether some sequence of words 
belongs to the language or not, but also, and above all, we want to know its 
internal structure. Again, the only systems capable of providing us with this 
information are those capable of generating recursive sets, to which we turn 
below. 
 The simplest computational devices are type 3 or regular systems, whose 
equivalent in the theory of abstract machines is the finite-state automaton. These 
systems have the power of generating sets of structurally very simple strings (or 
languages).29 Thus, for example, the language a*, which we encountered above, is 
regular, as are languages like a*b* (a possibly null sequence of as followed by a 
possibly null sequence of bs), anbm (a non-null sequence of as followed by a non-
null sequence of bs), and the language {a, b}* (that is, the one constituted by 
sequences of as and bs of any length and in any order). A quick glance at these 
languages is sufficient to see that linear order is not a problem for this kind of 
system, as is perfectly possible to build grammars (or automata) capable of gene-
rating sequences where symbols follow a strict order; but this is not a sufficient 
guarantee of adequacy and for regular grammars to capture the complexities of 
natural languages. In fact, Chomsky, in a brief note (Chomsky 1956b), has 
already demonstrated that a language like anbn (a sequence of as followed by a 
sequence with the same number of bs) is beyond the generative power of a finite-
state system. The datum to which we need to pay attention here is that the 
complexity of this new language has nothing to do with the relative order of both 
substrings, but rather with the fact that both substrings must be of the same 
length, which is equivalent to saying that there exists a dependency relation bet-
ween both substructures. In other words, in order to be sure that both substrings 
will be of the same length, we need some device to keep track of the number of 
symbols used during the process of construction of the first substring, such that 
we can access this information while we are building the second one. In a nut-
shell, we need memory, a resource which is not available in a finite-state auto-
maton. As Chomsky points out in the reference cited above, natural languages 
have plenty of this kind of dependency relation,30 which automatically invali-
                                                
    29  It is important not to confuse the term ‘language’ as we use it here in the context of formal 
language and automata theory, with the way we use it in the rest of this paper, which 
corresponds to its traditional meaning in the field of generative linguistics. In the former 
case, ‘language’ refers to a set of strings generated by a grammar; in the latter case, to the 
capacity of humans to produce and comprehend sentences. The equivalence is not precise, 
but assuming there is one, the ‘grammar’ of a mathematician is like the ‘language’ of a 
linguist, who pays little or no attention at all to lists of sentences and is more interested in 
the construction of grammars. 
    30  Such as, for example, constructions of the if… then-type, or relative clauses, to name just two 
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dates the ability of finite-state systems to capture some of the most basic pro-
perties of human language. 
 In the light of these results — well known, as we have seen, since the 1950s 
— research in the field of the formal complexity of natural language turned its 
attention to type 2 and type 1 systems. This research was motivated, on the one 
hand, by what for some linguists was a premature quantum leap towards the 
development of transformational models, after Chomsky’s rejection of context-
free systems as adequate models for natural language grammars (see Chomsky 
1957: chap. 5) and, on the other hand, because of some formal results that ap-
peared to indicate that transformational models were equivalent to unrestricted 
rewriting systems (Peters & Ritchie 1973). Thus, around the mid-1980s, an impor-
tant body of data was available, justifying, on the one hand, Chomsky’s dismissal 
of type 2 grammars (see, in particular, Bresnan et al. 1982 and Shieber 1985) but, 
on the other hand, showing that the necessary expressive power was only 
slightly above type 2 systems, within a complexity space not identified by 
Chomsky when he defined his Hierarchy, and which Joshi (1985) named mild 
context-sensitivity.31 Whatever the definitive position of natural language within 
the complexity scale, however, our main concern here is to characterize the 
differences between the different systems within the space between type 3 
grammars and type 0 grammars. For this purpose, formal languages are a useful 
tool, since they help us to focus on specific structural properties and on the 
necessary computational resources to deal with them. Let’s go back, then, to the 
language anbn, which, as we saw, is not a type 3 language, but a type 2 language. 
Depending on the kind of structural description we want for, say, the string 
aaabbb, a context-free grammar offers us a number of alternatives, of which we 
only contemplate the following, 
 
(1) [ai [aj [ak bk] bj] bi], 
 
where sub-indices indicate the presence of some dependency between the 
elements sharing the same sub-index. As we will see presently, the source of 
complexity is not in the number of dependencies, but in the relations among 
them. Note that in (1) dependencies are strictly nested, and a type 2 system is 
perfectly capable of dealing with constructions with multiple nested depen-
dencies (or, for that matter, with sets of independent nested dependencies, that 
is, anbncmdm, n ≠ m, is also a type 2 language). As we pointed out earlier, the key is 
                                                
of them. Note, by the way, that what is important is not that both strings be of the same 
length, but that some dependency relation holds between two elements separated by an 
arbitrary long sequence of symbols. As we will see presently, the number and nature of 
these dependencies are critical factors at the time of assessing the degree of complexity of a 
language. 
    31  Which, moreover, means that such expressive power would sit below that of indexed 
grammars. So far, only one objection with respect to these results has been presented in 
connection with the sub-system of Mandarin names for cardinal numbers, whose properties 
appear to be beyond the power of mild context-sensitive grammars (Radzinski 1991). It is 
significant, however, that this result is connected to number names, which, for some 
authors, may be indicative of some extra-linguistic factor not directly related to the real 
complexity of natural language; see Pullum (1986). 
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in memory, a resource that is available to a push-down automaton (our FC2), but 
not to a finite-state machine (our FC3). The push-down stack in a push-down 
automaton supplies the additional workspace where we can store those symbols 
we have generated (for example, three as) and which we pop out as we add bs to 
the string: For each b we add to the string, we pop an a out of the stack, such that, 
when the stack is empty, the process is over. Given the structure of the stack, 
which follows a first-in/last-out regime, we can see that nested dependencies fall 
within the power of type 2 grammars since, when we write the first b, we pop out 
the last a that went into the stack, and so on, until the point at which we write the 
last b and pop out the first a we stored in memory. Suppose now that depen-
dencies are organized as in (2):32 
 
(2) aiajakbibjbk 
 
Note that in this case the dependencies are crossed, such that the first a is related 
to the first b, the second a with the second b, and so on. This kind of structure is 
beyond the processing power of a push-down automaton, as are more complex 
languages like anbncn. Without for the moment going into great detail (but see 
Weir 1994 and Joshi & Schabes 1997: sect. 7), what we need here is a more power-
ful automaton, one we can get by just improving the capabilities of the memory 
system, extending and restructuring it such that it will be able to create addi-
tional stacks to store data any time that this is required by the computation.33 
 Thus, and on the basis of the preceding discussion, it is clear that the 
progression up the scale of complexity is a function of the changes introduced in 
the memory system, with no other modification of any fundamental property of the 
computational system being necessary. This observation puts us in a position not 
only of being able to characterize the phenotypes represented in Figure 13 in 
computational terms, but also of being able to determine the kinds of alterations 
of the developmental system which are necessary to ‘jump’ from one phenotype 
to the other. Therefore, assuming that we have a simple (but recursive) 
                                                
    32  This is the case of the cross-serial dependencies found in Dutch and in some varieties of 
Southern German, where the English construction …that John saw Peter help Mary swim may 
be expressed in Dutch as …dat Jan Piet Marie zag helpen zwemmen. 
    33  This is an extremely intuitive characterization of the embedded push-down automaton, 
which is equivalent to a mild context-sensitive system. We are using this example here, 
instead of that of the linear bounded automaton, because as Weir (1992, 1994) has shown, 
push-down automata constitute a general model of automata, of which the classical push-
down automaton (with one stack) and the embedded push-down automaton are only two 
particular cases, the simplest ones within a scale of increasing complexity definable 
exclusively in terms of improvements introduced in the storage system. 
  Weir’s results in fact go well beyond that, since they can be generalized to the whole 
family of languages made up by type 2 and type 1 languages in the Chomsky Hierarchy and 
which constitute a natural class within the Hierarchy, sharing a number of interesting 
computational properties (e.g., recognition in polynomial time and decidability, among 
others). Weir’s work defines a sub-hierarchy within the old hierarchy, in which we observe 
a progression towards higher degrees of complexity definable just in terms of the levels of 
embedding of the memory stacks (i.e. stacks of stacks, stacks of stacks of stacks, and so on), 
a particularly relevant mathematical result for the proposals we develop in this article. 
Sergio Balari & Guillermo Lorenzo 
 
36 
computational system, we only need first to add some memory, and thereafter 
progressively to sophisticate this system of memory, in order to make the 
transition from one phenotype to the other possible ones, going up the scale of 
complexity and concomitantly acquiring the ability to execute computational 
operations of an increasing complexity (Uriagereka 2008). This is, in essence, the 
sketch of our proposal for the origins of the FL, which would be the product of an 
evolutionary process with the effect of increasing and ameliorating the system of 
memory available to an original computational system, until the point at which 
sufficient capacity was reached to give way to what today we know as 
language.34 
 
3.3. Steps towards the Identification of the Control Parameter and the Recon-
struction of the Evolutionary Process 
 
The steps, certainly rather tentative, towards the definition of the control 
parameter identifiable as the main trigger of the developmental changes capable 
of causing the evolutionary process described in the previous section force us to 
picture a minimally realistic image of the computational system underlying 
language. With a precision number we will introduce below, we will assume a 
proposal quite similar to Lieberman’s (2006) model of the ‘basal ganglia 
grammar’ (BGG). 
 Philip Lieberman’s model is based on a fundamental distinction between: 
 
(A) a cognitive pattern generator, whose inhibition/excitation mechanism is 
localized in the basal ganglia; and 
(B) a working memory space, which is located in Broca’s area. 
(Lieberman 2006: 207–209) 
 
These are, respectively, the sub-cortical (A) and cortical (B) components of a 
circuit which Lieberman defines in functional terms as an iterative sequencing 
machine, which is at work when we walk, talk or understand a sentence 
(Lieberman 2006). Assuming this global picture, we wish, however, to introduce 
a couple a qualifications about the adoption of this neuro-anatomical structure as 
the basis of our model for the computational system underlying language. 
 Firstly, basal ganglia comprise a complex anatomical structure which 
                                                
    34  As the reader may have already guessed, our hypothesis rests on two basic premises: (i) that 
Church’s Thesis is true and (2) that the set of sentences of a natural language is recursive. Of 
course, there is no shortage of proposals denying either (or both) of the two premises above. 
For example, Penrose (1994) rejects (i) in favor of what he calls ‘quantum computation’ 
which, according to him, sits beyond classical computational models. As for (ii), Langen-
doen & Postal (1984) argue that the set of sentences in a natural language is not recursively 
enumerable (and, therefore, neither recursive nor enumerable), and that its cardinal is a 
transfinite number, that is, greater or equal to the cardinal of the set R of real numbers. In 
this case, any attempt to provide a computational characterization of the FL is doomed, 
because a non-enumerable set is, by definition, non-computable. Indeed, then, should any of 
these proposals turn out to be true, we would be out of the game — as would a large part of 
those who strive to unveil the mysteries of human cognition. 
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appears to participate in several cortico–subcortico–cortical circuits associated 
with the regulation of different aspects of mobility, cognition, and emotivity 
(Figure 14). Following Cummings (1993), Lieberman (2006: 163–167) estimates 
that the so-called ‘prefrontal dorsolateral circuit’ is the one involved in the 
programming of the motor control of speech, in sentence comprehension, and in 
other aspects of cognition. This circuit projects from this cortical area towards the 
dorso-lateral area of the caudate nucleus, the lateral dorso-medial area of the 
globus pallidus, and the thalamus which, in turn, projects back to the prefrontal 
cortex (Figure 15). We will assume, with Lieberman, that this is in effect the 
circuit that language uses as a computational system. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 14:  The basal ganglia 
[The basal ganglia comprise a complex anatomical structure located in the inner brain, 
with numerous afferent and efferent projections among their own components and inclu-
ding the frontal cortex and the thalamus.] 
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Figue 15:  Prefrontal dorso-lateral circuit 
[The prefrontal dorso-lateral circuit is involved in the motor programming of speech, in 
sentence comprehension, and in other aspects of cognition. Other similar, and partially 
overlapping, cortico-subcortico-cortical circuits participate in other aspects of cognition 
and behavior. For example, a circuit projecting from (1) the prefrontal cortex towards (2) 
the striatum (caudate nucleus + putamen), (3) the globus pallidus and the substantia 
nigra, and (4) the thalamus which, in turn, projects back to (1) the prefrontal cortex, 
appears to be involved in affective modulation. (Based on Cummings 1993.)] 
 
 
 Now, and this constitutes our second qualification of the BGG model, we 
contend that limiting to Broca’s area the localization of the working memory 
space is an assumption that oversimplifies. The involvement of Broca’s area in 
the system of computations of the FL is unquestionable.35 However, it is quite 
plausible that this structure is part of a larger cortical circuit with bidirectional 
projections between the frontal and parieto-temporal areas, within a system of 
working memory networks such as the one postulated by Aboitiz et al. (2006).36 
The matter is not entirely clear. However, for the purposes of this article, it is 
important for us to localize the working memory of the computational system 
within the cortical component, more or less large, of the anatomical structure 
making up such a system.37 
                                                
    35  See, among others, Embick et al. (2000), Grodzinsky (2000), Moro et al. (2001), and Musso et 
al. (2003). 
    36  See also Aboitiz & García (1997). On the role of the frontal lobes in language processing, see 
the review by Friederici (2002), as well as the studies by Shtyrov et al. (2003) and Pulver-
müller & Assadollahi (2007). 
    37 For a partially divergent model, see Ullman (2004), where the assumption is made that the 
computational aspect of language utilizes a system of ‘procedural memory’ distributed 
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 Our main thesis in this section is, as we already put forward at the end of 
section 3.2, that those perturbations which motivated the bifurcation of the 
computational system in the direction of context-sensitivity (FC1) during human 
evolution have a direct connection with the development of the cortical structure 
supporting working memory. This idea is entirely justified if we take into 
account that the different levels of computational complexity making up 
morphogenetic space as defined in Figure 13 correlate with the capacity and the 
organization of the system of memory associated with the pattern generator. In 
purely formal terms, one goes up the hierarchy as memory gains capacity and, in 
terms of our evolutionary scenario, bifurcations occur within the morphogenetic 
space as a more developed cortical structure is available to support this. Within 
the framework of our proposal, however, no greater inter-specific differences are 
expected at the level of the system’s pattern-generation procedure nor in the sub-
cortical structure acting as its material support. As a matter of fact, from an 
evolutionary perspective the basal ganglia, as opposed to the cortex, have been 
described as highly conservative structures among amniotes (reptiles, birds, and 
mammals) (see Reiner et al. 1984).38 
 This thesis has a number of interesting consequences, to which we would 
like to devote some space. Firstly, it is our contention that the developmental 
event giving rise to the cortical structure serving as the physical support for the 
working memory space of the computational system is not an evolutionary event 
directly related to language. As we already noted above, the kind of brain growth 
which characterizes human evolution appears to be connected with the 
overproduction of precursor cells during cytogenesis, meaning that it is not a 
process oriented towards the production of one or another specific type of cell. 
Kaskan & Finlay (2201: 27) point out that, from the point of view of development, 
the brain is one of the few organs whose the development appears to follow a set 
rules affecting the organ as a whole. This observation is, in our opinion, 
particularly interesting, since it supports the idea that the perturbations giving 
rise to the higher level of complexity of the computational system subserving 
language do not seem to be, in any sense of the term, adaptations for this linguistic 
function, but rather that such a level of complexity is a mere side-effect of a more 
general process of brain reorganization which took place without specific 
motivation.39 
 That said, and along the lines of Rakic & Kornack (2001: 46), we are persua-
ded that the control parameter whose perturbations gave rise to the level of 
complexity necessary for language may well have been a regulatory gene (or a 
                                                
across the frontal and parietal cortical areas, the basal ganglia, and the cerebellum. In 
Ullman’s model, however, no computational specializations between a sequencer and a 
working memory are assumed, and the basal ganglia are seen as responsible for the 
stimulation and inhibition of the memorized patterns across the whole brain circuit. 
38  Our proposal, therefore, has an important difference from that of Hauser et al. (2002) in the 
sense that, for us, the evolutionary novelty that made possible the emergence of language 
would not be, strictly speaking, recursion, but rather the ability to deal with recursive 
patterns via a higher level of complexity. 
39  For some considerations about this point, see Chomsky (1968: 124), Chomsky (1975: 74), or, 
more recently, Hauser et al. (2002: 1578). 
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collection thereof) responsible for the proliferation of neuronal precursors. A 
mutation in this gene (or genes) in humans would have had an effect of ‘pera-
morphosis’ or ‘terminal extension’ (or ‘hypermorphosis’) in cortical development 
which, even if minimal in terms of chronological timing, may have had far-
reaching anatomical repercussions, given the exponential relation between the 
extension of cytogenesis and the development of brain structure (Figure 11).40 
With respect to this idea, however, it is important to make a couple of points 
clearer: 
 First, by pointing to a regulatory gene as the control parameter responsible 
for the evolutionary transformation we have just suggested, we are not denying 
that other morphogenetic parameters involved in the very same developmental 
system remained unchanged. On the contrary, the perturbation of the control 
parameter in question may well have triggered a whole chain of perturbations 
affecting other parameters, with obvious repercussions on the structure and 
function of the resulting phenotype. In this particular case, we can plausibly 
speak of a chain-effect affecting such factors as cortex myelinization or dendritic 
growth, for which also late termination effects have been observed (Gibson 1991). 
As was made clear in section 2.2, a control parameter is not a unique causal 
agent, but just the initial trigger in the chain of reactions giving rise to a new 
morphology. 
 Second, although a direct consequence of the late termination of the 
development of cortical structure, the mere gross increment in the population of 
neurons cannot be taken as an indication that the complexity level attained by the 
system is a direct function of the said increment. In this connection, it is 
important to take into account the general thesis of dynamic systems according to 
which there is no linear and simple relation between the morphogenetic 
parameters and the properties of the phenotype. Quite to the contrary, then, the 
most direct effect of a perturbation (in our case, the gross increment in the 
population of neurons) may trigger novel phenotypic effects which nevertheless 
need not imply the incorporation into the developmental system of new 
morphogenetic parameters. Particularly relevant for the case in point is Terrence 
Deacon’s observation that larger brains will necessarily possess more laminated, 
more highly nucleated, more parcellated structures, and so on, just as a side-
effect of the growth of the neuronal population with respect to brain size (Deacon 
2000: 61). We understand that very plausibly these are factors capable of having a 
great impact on the kind and complexity of the operations the brain is able to 
execute. 
 There is another important question deserving further comment. 
According to our proposal, the level of complexity of the computational system 
of language would be explained in evolutionary terms as a particular aspect of a 
global perturbation in the developmental system of the brain, and not, therefore, 
as an episode in brain development directly selected for its advantages related to 
linguistic function. This is not to deny that, next to the global reorganization of 
the brain, other developmental events may have taken place directly related to 
the functionality of resulting structures of this global process of reorganization. 
                                                
40  Along similar lines, see Edelman (1987), Finlay & Darlington (1995), and Deacon (2000). 
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As pointed out by Hofman (2001: 122–123), in fact, brain sub-structuring into 
anatomically and functionally specialized modular units is one of the effects 
derivable from the expansion pattern typical of its evolution, and, as Rakic & 
Kornack (2001: 49) add, this causes the introduction of novel organizational units 
and interaction pathways among these units which may later be targeted by 
natural selection. 
 In this regard, the human mutations of the FOXP2 gene,41 which have been 
the focus of various studies and interpretations in the last few years, may well 
find its way into our proposals. The function of this gene in the regulation and 
functioning of the brain structures which, following the BGG model, we 
identified with the computational system of language is a well established fact.42 
Remember, however, that our proposal singles out as the event responsible for 
the evolutionary change of this system the increment in the capacity of its wor-
king memory, which, in turn, we identified with the cortical component of the 
BGG. Thus, our suggestion puts special emphasis on the overdevelopment of the 
cortex, but less so — in evolutionary terms — on the basal ganglia. The idea is, 
therefore, compatible with our observations above concerning the fact that in 
brain growth a disproportion is observed between the growth of the cortical 
component and that of sub-cortical structures, the basal ganglia among them 
(Hofman 2001: 117–118). Now, this is not incompatible with the fact that in this 
context some specific mutations capable of adding robustness to development 
and of modulating the global activity of this system may have been selected. This 
is in fact what, as we see it, appears to be the more realistic interpretation for the 
positive selection of the human variety of FOXP2, which would thus not be 
responsible for the evolution of the computational system of language per se, but 
rather a response to the kind of functionality independently attained by this 
system during its recent evolutionary history.43 
 One must not forget that language is not only a system with specific 
computational properties. It is also a symbolic system which, precisely because it 
possesses such computational properties, also possesses the property of discrete 
infinity.44 This is important because, as pointed out by Lorenzo (2006), it is per-
fectly plausible to assume that in the animal kingdom certain behaviors are 
                                                
41  See Lai et al. (2001). The exact dating of said mutations is still a much debated issue: Enard et 
al. (2002) originally attributed to them an antiquity of some 125,000 years, but Krause et al. 
(2007), after the identification of some fossil DNA from Neanderthal individuals found in 
the cave of Sidrón (Asturias), extend this date to 300,000 years and argue for the existence of 
the human variety of the gene already in Archaic sapiens. Coop et al. (2008) argue, however, 
that the application of their statistical method for phylogenetic dating yields a result below 
50,000 years; for a critical overview of the Neanderthal FOXP2 and its possible implications 
for the linguistic capacities of these hominids, see Benítez Burraco et al. (2008) and Balari et 
al. (2008). 
42  See Ferland et al. (2003), Lai et al. (2003), Liégeois et al. (2003), Takahashi et al. (2003), and 
Benítez Burraco (2009) for a comprehensive state of the art. 
43  In this connection, it is interesting to note the recent identification of a gene (CNTNAP2) 
involved in cortical development and which integrates the FOXP2 regulatory chain. Some 
varieties of this gene may be the source of diseases more or less selectively affecting 
language; see Vernes et al. (2008). 
44  For a characterization of this property, see, for example, Hauser et al. (2002: 1571). 
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observed which suggest the presence of a symbolic system (or the rudiments 
thereof) — as is perhaps the case of the systems of calls and gestures of some 
primates (see Cheney & Seyfarth 1990, 2005; also Tomasello & Call 1997: chap. 8), 
or the use of very complex recursive patterns, as may be the case with some birds 
(Marler 1998), without this implying the simultaneous presence of both complex 
recursion and symbolism. To extend and to perfect the working memory space is, 
therefore, a necessary condition for the emergence of language, but not a 
sufficient one. This dissolves a potential objection to our notion of computational 
phenotype, namely that it may not necessarily be the case that this phenotype 
(and its corresponding morphological phenotype) correlates with the presence of 
FL. In fact, this observation is correct and our FC1 might well correspond to non-
linguistic ‘minds’ which would nevertheless be capable of producing complex 
recursive patterns within other areas of cognition, such as, for example, motor 
sequences or melodic sequences in birdsong. Remember that, according to 
Lieberman’s (2006) model, the basal ganglia comprise a sequencer of cognitive 
patterns, but cognitive patterns may be of many different sorts and the 
sequencer, just because of connectivity and working space limitations, might 
have access to only a single type of pattern or to a limited collection of them 
(motor patterns and melodic patterns, for instance), but not to others (symbolic 
patterns, assuming these are even available). In the wake of this line of reasoning, 
a whole mosaic of evolutionary possibilities opens itself, where symbolic 
capacities and complex recursion may have appeared independently from each 
other or even coexist without meeting, with the single exception, perhaps, of 
human language.45 Thus, for example, and focusing on birds and primates — 
which are, perhaps, the most interesting species in this connection, apart from 
also being the most studied ones — we see that complex recursion may have 
evolved associated with some abilities observed in birds, specifically with bird-
song and nest building (Figure 16), whereas evidence for symbolic behavior is 
meager and, in any case, with no hint of complex recursion.46 As for primates, 
hardly any evidence exists suggesting the possession of abilities with a subjacent 
complex recursion apart from, perhaps, motor control,47 whereas some obser-
vations suggest the presence of vestigial symbolic or proto-symbolic capacities.48 
                                                
45  For example, Balari (2005, 2006) argues for such a scenario of the casual ‘meeting’ between a 
symbolic capacity grounded on social cognition and complex recursion through a 
heterochronic process in the development of the nervous system as the basis for the origins 
of human linguistic capacities; see also Lorenzo (2008). 
46  Griesser (2008) notes, for example, that the Siberian jay (Perisoreus infaustus) makes use of a 
series of alarm calls whereby it discriminates whether a hawk, its main predator, is (1) 
inactive sitting on a tree branch, (2) looking for prey, or (3) in attack attitude. These signals 
nevertheless lack the structured and discrete character of other forms of birdsong with 
which, without any hint of symbolic content, many birds attract the attention of potential 
sexual partners. 
47  See Tomasello & Call (1997: chap. 3) for an overview of manual dexterity and use of tools in 
different species of monkeys and primates. 
48  The presence of alarm call systems in inferior primates has been known for years, usually 
based on specific associations with one or another type of predator. See the pioneering work 
by Struhsaker (1967) on the alarm calls of vervet monkeys, as well as Hauser (2000) and 
Cheney & Seyfarth (2005) for up-to-date overviews of this issue. Recently, Arnold & 
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Figure 16:  Computational complexity without symbolic representation & communication 
[Making a knot requires the application of an operation over a part of the constructed 
figure, and keeping it in active memory until the moment at which the operation 
completing the figure is executed. It requires, therefore, the participation of a working 
memory capable of an active bookkeeping of the operations executed. Thus one must not 
exclude the fact that the level of computational complexity required for building a 
hanging nest, such as those constructed by many species of weaver birds, occupies a 
relatively high position within the Chomsky Hierarchy, even perhaps within our FC1. For 
the building behavior of birds and other animals, see Hansell (2000 and 2005). On the 
relevance for knots to infer complex computations, see Camps & Uriagereka (2006). In the 
image, some knotting and weaving techniques used by weaver birds. (Taken from 
Hansell 2000: 85.)] 
                                                
Zuberbühler (2006a, 2006b) have argued that some Old World monkeys (specifically 
Cercopithecus nictitans or white nose monkeys) can combine two different kinds of calls they 
also emit independently. The truth is that this type of capacity does not seem to require 
more than our FC3; it will then be very far from the computational complexity of the pheno-
type corresponding to human linguistic capacities. The ‘parametric distance’ between one 
phenotype and the other foreseen in this work automatically invalidates Arnold & Zuber-
bühler’s thesis that human language syntax may be derived from the kinds of combinatorial 
capacities observed in these monkeys through a simple process of gradual and continuous 
evolutions. This issue is discussed further in Lorenzo (2008) and in Longa (2008). 
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 We believe that these considerations have important methodological 
implications, especially with respect to the application of the comparative 
method when seeking precursors of the FL or of some of its constituent 
properties like complex recursion. Indeed, one of the most direct consequences of 
what we have said so far is that formal grammar and automata theory may prove 
to be an extremely useful tool at the time of assessing the abilities and capabilities 
shown by other animal species, a point also argued for by, for example, O’Donnel 
et al. (2005). However, one must also be careful when using these theoretical tools 
in experimental design, for example, in order to avoid an excessive trivialization 
of the results. There already exist, as a matter of fact, some works along these 
lines which have been the target of very strong criticisms. For example, Gentner 
et al. (2006) have experimentally tested the abilities of some specimens of Euro-
pean starling (Sturnus vulgaris) to learn to discriminate songs with different 
degrees of complexity, correlating with different types of formal grammars. The 
birds in this study were instructed, using reinforced conditioning, to identify 
sequences following a pattern of n repetitions of a succession of two character-
istic sounds (abn) of the species’ birdsong, formally characterizable in terms of a 
regular grammar (type 3 in the Chomsky Hierarchy). These birds were moreover 
instructed using the same method to identify songs following a pattern of n 
repetitions of a sound followed by an identical number of repetitions of other 
characteristic sounds of the species (the language anbn, we have already come 
across before in this article; see the end of section 3.2). Unlike the former case, the 
grammar associated with this pattern is a type 2 context-free grammar, with a 
principle of recursive embedding of each new pair ([ab]) within another identical 
pair ([a[a[...]b]b]). Not without difficulties, but with a level of success above 
chance (nine in every ten individuals), starlings were capable of identifying the 
songs following this complex pattern. Similar experiments carried out by Fitch & 
Hauser (2004) with tamarin monkeys (Saguinus aedipus, a species of New World 
monkey) offered quite different results. According to the authors, these monkeys 
find almost no difficulties in discriminating sequences of several repetitions of an 
abn pattern, made up by a syllable picked from an initial inventory of eight 
syllables (a), followed by another syllable picked from a second inventory with 
eight different syllables (b), from other sequences not following this pattern. They 
find, however, insurmountable difficulties when it comes to discriminating 
sequences made up by some specific number of syllables from the first inventory 
followed by the same number of syllables from the second inventory (again, anbn) 
from deviant sequences that do not follow this pattern. These monkeys, then, 
appear to be able to classify sequences unproblematically within the range of a 
regular grammar, but appear to be incapable of doing so with only slightly more 
complex sequences but which are already within the context-free space. One 
interpretation of these works is, then, that tamarin monkeys possess a compu-
tational regime located within our FC3 phenotype, whereas starlings would have 
reached at least our FC2 phenotype. In their reply to Fitch & Hauser (2004), 
however, Perruchet & Rey (2005) question the validity of these results on the 
basis of the fact, so they argue, that humans probably do not process patterns like 
anbn making use of a center-embedding context-free grammar, which might be an 
indication that other species, like starlings, also process them by means of a 
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different strategy.49 Besides, and as pointed out by Pullum & Rogers (2006) and 
Rogers & Pullum (forthcoming), another problem with the Fitch & Hauser (2004) 
experiments is that these focus their attention essentially on the auditory process-
sing capabilities of tamarins and, along the lines of the preceding discussion, 
there is no guarantee that animal species different from ours show the very same 
abilities within the very same areas of cognition. In fact, let us suppose that, say, 
tamarins (unlike starlings, for example) might not be able to auditorely discrimi-
nate very complex sequences, but might possess abilities in other areas which 
could effectively be formally characterized by means of more complex systems. 
Despite this slightly skeptical note, we still believe that research aimed at the 
identification of the computational phenotypes instantiated by different species 
may play a crucial role at the time of validating the hypotheses presented above. 
 Returning then to the case of humans, in short, it is clear that the evolution-
ary process that gave rise to the FL, and which we characterized as an extension 
of the working space in the cortical area, would also have allowed the general 
sequencer access to cognitive types of several modalities, essentially of the sym-
bolic type. This need not, however, be taken as an inevitable consequence of the 
growth of the cortex,50 which may eventually explain the observed differences 
among other hominid species regarding their symbolic capacities. 
 Also in this connection, and without going into extensive detail, our 
opinion is that the evolutionary change that took place in connection with the 
emergence of the FL occurred only recently, after the branching point eventually 
leading to Homo neanderthalensis, meaning that this species never benefited from 
these changes. In the archaeological record associated with Neanderthals, no 
evidence is found that suggests the presence of a computational endowment 
either equivalent or even similar to what is needed for processing human 
language. For example, Camps & Uriagereka (2006) observed that the absence of 
objects implying the elaboration of knots — like necklace beads, fishing imple-
ments, small projectiles, and so on, all common enough in the sapiens record 
since some 80,000 years ago — may be illustrative of this fact (see also Piattelli–
Palmarini & Uriagereka 2005).51 As before, we must be careful and not forget the 
methodological cautions mentioned above and be prepared to discover that 
Neanderthals might have possessed such computational capacities in other 
                                                
    49  It is a well known fact that center-embedding structures are not easily processed by humans 
— at least since the observations made by Noam Chomsky and George Miller in the early 
1960s (Chomsky & Miller 1963 and Miller & Chomsky 1963) — and this must be taken into 
account at the time of assessing some complexity results. Center-embedding structures are, 
in some sense, simple, since they fall within the computational capabilities of a type 2 
system, but, at the same time — for humans, at least — they are complex, since center-
embedding appears not to be one of the structural options selected by our species for the 
construction of linguistic objects. We use, however, other, formally more complex structures 
in addition to showing a clear preference for right-recursive objects. Note, however, that 
these considerations apply only to constituent structure, since, as pointed out in section 3.2, 
other kinds of dependency relations do follow a center-embedding pattern. Of course, as we 
already underline in the text, this may not necessarily be the case with other species. 
    50  For some considerations about the functions of a hyper-developed cortex in humans, see 
Gibson (1993), Calvin (1993, 1996), and McKinney (2000). 
    51  See, again, what was pointed out in the caption to Figure 16. 
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domains.52 Whatever that ability may have been, we are pretty sure that it was 
not symbolic communication, in the light of the otherwise symbolic poverty of 
Neanderthals and of the strong asymmetry between their archaeological record 
and that of anatomically modern humans (see Balari et al. 2008 for an in-depth 
and recent analysis of these matters).53 
 
 
4. Final Considerations 
 
A complete fulfillment of the research agenda sketched in section 2 of this article 
and made explicit at the beginning of section 3.1 would require a detailed clarifi-
cation of the environmental and populational conditions which were capable of 
filtering the distribution of computational phenotypes among the first humans in 
order to favor the result whose evolutionary model we developed throughout the 
preceding sections. However, we are not in a position to tackle this issues rigor-
ously for reasons we hope will not be taken as the mere justification of patently 
visible gaps in our explanation (which we openly assume), but simply as the 
compromise that we will devote special attention to these topics in the very near 
future in what must be taken as the second part of this article. 
 Here we specifically focused on the evolutionary explanation of the 
computational system underlying the human faculty of language (or, following 
Hauser et al. 2002, the Faculty of Language in the Narrow sense, FLN). This 
means we only dealt with a particular aspect of language and, therefore, that we 
                                                
    52  That said, it may be convenient to recall that Frederick Coolidge and Thomas Wynn have 
long defended the idea that the deep asymmetry between the fossil records associated with 
Neanderthals and anatomically modern humans might be due to the lack on the part of the 
former of the kind of ‘extended’ working memory which the latter eventually accessed. 
According to these authors, the singularity of the Neanderthal behavior would not really be 
a matter of lack of connections between a complex computational system and the kinds of 
abilities subjacent to the material culture associated with this species, but rather directly to 
the lack of a computational system as complex as the one evolved by the modern mind. See 
Wynn & Coolidge (2004) and Coolidge & Wynn (2005, 2007) for their analysis of technical 
intelligence, and Wynn & Coolidge (2008a) for their analysis of collective activity; for an 
overview, see Wynn & Coolidge (2008b).  
  A word of caution is advisable here. Both Coolidge and Wynn and the present authors 
appeal to evolutionary changes affecting the working memory space as an explanation of 
modern ‘mentality’. However, it is important to see that in our case the term ‘memory’ is 
used from a computational perspective only, with no compromise in regard to some specific 
psychological model of memory. This is not the case of Coolidge and Wynn, who assume 
the model developed by the British psychologist Alan Baddeley since the mid-1980s (see 
Baddeley 1986, for a classical formulation, and Baddeley 2000 for the most recent version of 
the model). Of course, our proposal and that of Coolidge and Wynn are compatible, but we 
still want to emphasize the fact that, so far, ours does not commit us to any specific psycho-
logical model. 
    53  For additional evidence supporting this view, the analysis of the patterns of dentition in 
Neanderthals appear to indicate that their developmental program proceeded much faster 
than that of humans (see Smith et al. 2007), which may be taken as an additional clue in 
favor of the fact that the alteration in the developmental pattern that gave rise to the 
reorganization of the human brain may not have occurred before the speciation event 
leading to modern sapiens. 
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have so far only provided a partial explanation of this uniquely human capacity. 
True, this is a particularly crucial aspect of the evolution of the FL, especially if 
we accept the thesis of Hauser et al. (2002) that this aspect might concentrate the 
most distinctive (even exclusive) aspects of language within the broader context 
of animal cognition. We only slightly qualified this assertion, pointing at 
evidence which may indicate the presence of computational systems with 
degrees of complexity similar to the FL but associated with cognitive capacities 
that give rise to such disparate behavior as nest building.54 In our opinion, the 
most distinctive element of language, seen from an evolutionary perspective, is 
the kind of associations this computational system has been able to establish 
through the recent evolutionary history of the human species via other capacities 
(sensory, motor, conceptual and intentional ones), bringing about a unified 
cognitive system dedicated to the internal representation and external 
transmission of complex contents. Our ongoing work is already oriented towards 
an attempt at explaining the evolutionary convergence of all these ‘precursors’ in 
a unified mental system as a result of alterations in the developmental pattern of 
the human brain. To the extent that no clear answer to this matter is available to 
us, we will also not be able to provide a rigorous answer to the questions posed 
at the beginning of this last section. The reason is simple: We believe that the 
populational processes which made possible the proliferation and generalization 
of the FC1 associated with the FL had little to do with the emergence of this 
particular cognitive phenotype, but they are instead related to the association of 
FL with the kind of mental capacities which made it a system apt for the 
computation of externalizable mental representations (or, again following Hauser 
et al. 2002, the Faculty of Language in the Broad sense or FLB). 
 We can, however, offer a brief preliminary sketch of our ideas in this 
respect. We believe that the first humans who showed the capacity to externalize 
the complex expressions which their computational phenotype was able to 
process did not obtain great benefits from it. On the contrary, in the context of an 
evolutionary scenario dominated by forms of expressivity completely alien to the 
degree of sophistication of the sequences emitted by the members of this mutant 
population, it may well have been the case that it was taken as an element of 
stigmatization and exclusion for these individuals, who would have effectively 
been seen by the rest of the population as true “social monsters”.55 From a wider 
                                                
    54  Hauser et al. (2002) also contemplate this possibility when they note that the most formally 
complex features of language may also characterize other species’ representational systems 
like social intelligence or spatial orientation. The thesis they present as the “most probable 
option” is, however, that those systems are exclusively present in the linguistic compu-
tational system. 
    55  And here we can only borrow Lewontin’s (1998: 113) words:  
Thus a species that possesses linguistic competence may indeed take over the 
earth as a consequence of the technological and managerial capabilities that are 
the result of language, but in a species lacking linguistic competence, the 
rudimentary ability to form linguistic elements by a few individuals may be 
taken as a sign of difference that causes them to be expelled or even killed.   
 We want to make clear, however, that this notion of “social monster” is not the same notion 
of ‘monster’ as it was used in classical teratology nor, more concretely, the same as the 
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perspective, then, they would be ‘misfits’ to the social conditions in which their 
emergence took place. We believe, however, that social stigmatization against 
these individuals is the key factor that eventually favored the conditions for 
isolations (not necessarily allopatric) which made possible the preservation of the 
phenotype within the population (originally restricted to this stigmatized group), 
first, and eventually their proliferation and generalization within the whole 
population at some critical point in the early history of the human species. We 
tend to believe that such a critical point may coincide with the demographical 
crisis which, according to some authors like Behar et al. (2008), took place 
immediately before the intercontinental dispersion of modern humans. This 
situation, described as very close to extinction in a context of extreme environ-
mental adversity, could effectively have fostered populational replacement in 
favor of a cognitive phenotype which may have been extremely advantageous for 
its possessors. According to this idea, then, the special cognitive endowment of 
this ‘founding’ population (Mayr 1963) would not have originally been an adap-
tation, given the dominant social conditions at the moment of its emergence, but 
it would have possessed from the very beginning some adaptive potential (or 
‘adaptability’ in the sense of Reid 2007) which openly manifested itself at a 
critical point of human evolution. 
 What we have just sketched is prone to further elaboration and 
sophistication and, to this end, we need first a concrete model of the evolution of 
the FLB through development. In this article we have taken a first step in that 
direction, proposing a model for the evolution of its core component or FLN, 
based on the alteration of the developmental pattern of the cortical component 
serving as working memory for the computational system with a sequence 
machine located in the basal ganglia. The increment in memory capacity thus 
attained would have permitted the human brain to ‘jump’ towards a cognitive 
phenotype with qualitatively different computational capabilities compared with 
other existing phenotypes within a discontinuous space of computational 
regimes. To this end, we have followed rather closely some recent proposals 
within Evolutionary Developmental Biology and, in particular, those of Pere 
Alberch, a number of whose key ideas originally inspired this work. We are 
convinced that this inspiration will also take the lead in our future attempt to 
explain how the developmental pattern of the first humans may have been 
altered in order for this computational phenotype to give rise eventually to the 
linguistic phenotype that at present singles us out as a species. 
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